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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, the study of psychopathy as a be-
havioral disorder and social problem has received little 
attention by scientifically oriented researchers (Hare, 
1970). Instead, the literature relevant to psychopathy 
appears to be more concerned with clinical descriptions, 
treatment problems, and legal/moral issues rather than the 
empirical study of psychopathy. Although the clinical ob-
servations and treatment discussions are necessary and im-
portant, controlled studies concernin~ psychopathy are es-
sential for verification and clarification of the observa-
tions and discussions. The following study examined some 
clinical observations about psychopathy. 
One clinical observation that had been made by 
several authors (Cleckley, 1976; Duff, 1977; Hare, 1970) 
suggests that psychopathy is extremely self-centered and 
lacks the emotional responsivity necessary to develop and 
sustain normal interpersonal relationships. The observed 
interpersonal disturbance of the psychopath has been at-
tributed to an inability to share another's emotional ex-
perience; that is a deficit in empathy. However, little 
1 
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research directly studying the relationship between empathy 
and psychopathy has been conducted (Smith, 1978). Consid-
ering the implications for treatment, law enforcement, and 
prison reform that a deficit in empathy may have, the rela-
tionship between empathy and psychopathy was considered im-
portant for further study. 
One reason for the lack of research on empathy with 
psychopaths may be the considerable conceptual and method-
ological difficulties involved in studying empathy. For 
example, although empathy has been described as the ability 
to share or experience another's emotional experiences, re-
searchers disagree about the important aspects of this 
shared experience. Several researchers stress a cognitive 
approach to the sharing of experience and define empathy as 
knowing what another person feels (Berke, 1971; Chandler, 
1977; Savitsky & Czyzewski, 1978; Truax, 1972). Other re-
searchers stress an affective approach to empathy and define 
empathy as feeling what another person feels (Berger, 1962; 
Feshbach & Roe, 1968; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972}. A third 
group contends that both cognitive and affective elements 
are important elements of an empathic response and define 
empathy as both an emotional response and a cognitive un-
derstanding (Feshbach, 1978; Iannotti, Note 5}. The prob-
lems associated with definition are further compounded by 
the fact that investigators who may agree on a definition 
of empathy, do not agree on how to operationalize the defi-
• 
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nition. For example, researchers who agree that empathy is 
an affective response have measured empathy with self-report 
questionnaires, physiological measures, mood adjective check-
lists, and even the subject's willingness to administer 
electric shock. 
This lack of agreement on what empathy is and how 
it should be measured has led Smith (1978) to describe em-
pathy as a "slippery," "uneasy," "bugaboo" construct and 
minimized its importance in research on psychopathy. Re-
gardless of the conceptual and methodological problems that 
plague this research, empathy remains a central construct 
to clinical observations of psychopathy and should not be 
ignored. Two lines of research with antisocial populations 
further underscore the importance of the concept of empathy 
to the study of psychopathy. 
The first line of research concerns the autonomic 
reactivity of the psychopath. Changes in the activity of 
an individual's autonomic nervous system have been suggested 
to be an adequate measure of emotional responsiveness or 
emotional empathy (Stotland, 1969). Psychopaths have been 
reported to exhibit less autonomic reactivity than other 
prisoner groups while anticipating an aversive stimulus 
(Hare & Cox, 1978b). The lower level of autonomic activity 
demonstrated by the psychopath has been ~nterpreted as a 
deficit in emotional responsiveness or affective empathy. 
The second line of research supporting an empathy 
4 
deficit in psychopathy concerns the role-taking ability of 
the psychopath. Psychopaths are considered to be deficient 
in the ability to imagine another's role or to understand 
an experience from another's perspective (Gough, 1948). 
Psychopaths have exhibited poorer cognitive role-taking 
skills (Jurkovic & Prentice, 1977) and idiosyncratic inter-
personal construct systems (Widom, 1976) when compared to 
normal samples. The poorer role-taking ability of the psy-
chopath suggests a deficit in understanding another's emo-
tional experience or in cognitive empathy. 
The above studies suggest that psychdpaths do ex-
hibit a deficit in both cognitive and affective aspects of 
an empathic response. However, there has been no reported 
research utilizing a cognitive/affective definition of em-
pathy with a psychopathic sample. In this study, both the 
cognitive and affective aspects of empathy are examined in 
their relationship to the psychopath. 
The experimental manipulation of empathy with an 
antisocial population has also been a relatively neglected 
area of research. The research completed by Aderman and 
Berkowitz (1970) and Stotland (1969) suggests that empathy 
can be successfully induced or inhibited in college students 
by manipulating the observational instructions given to the 
subjects just before observing or listeqing to a distress 
situation. The use of this empathy manipulation with an 
antisocial population has not been previously reported and 
5 
may offer some important information concerning the rela-
tionship between empathy and psychopathy. 
The concept of empathy has also been hypothesized 
to be closely related to helping behavior. A number of 
theorists have suggested that helping behavior is motivated 
by empathy (e.g., Aderman & Berkowitz, 1970; Eisenberg-Berg 
& Mussen, 1978; Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1975; Iannotti, 
Note 5). Specifically, both an emotional response and a 
cognitive understanding have been postulated as important 
prerequisites of a helping response to a distress situation 
(Hoffman, 1975). However, research on the relationship be-
tween empathy and helping behavior has yielded conflicting 
results. The conflicting results may have occurred because 
many researchers ignore either the cognitive or affective 
aspects of empathy and have not consistently used legitimate 
distress situations. A study examining affective and cog-
nitive aspects of empathy with a distress situation may 
help clarify the relationship between empathy and helping 
behavior. 
Recognition of the problems in defining and assess-
ing empathy as well as the relevance of this variable in 
the study of psychopathy and altruistic behavior provided 
the motivation for the present study. In order to investi-
gate these relationships, psychopathic, neurotic, and a 
general comparison group of delinquent youths were assessed 
for both cognitive and affective aspects of empathy. In 
• 
6 
addition, the three delinquency groups were exposed to a 
distress situation involving the experimental manipulation 
of empathy and a helping situation where helping behavior 
was assessed. Psychopathic delinquents were hypothesized 
to score significantly lower in empathy (both cognitive and 
affective) , be less responsive to the empathy arousal manip-
ulation, and be less likely to help another than the 
neurotic or comparison groups. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Psychopathy 
The Concept. The concept of psychopathy has had a 
long and confusing evolution (McCord & McCord, 1956; Mor-
rison, 1978; Rotenberg & Diamond, 1971; Smith, 1978; 
Yochelson & Samenow, 1977). Vague definitions, moral is-
sues, and legal concepts have plagued and confused the con-
cept of psychopathy throughout its history and continue to 
plague it even today. During this evolution, some of the 
terms used to label the concept of psychopathy have inclu-
ded antisocial personality, differential insensitivity 
(Rotenberg, 1978), "mania without delirium, moral insanity, 
constitutional psychopathic inferiority, semantic dementia, 
moral mania, moral imbecility, egopathy, anethopathy, 
anomia, tropathy, and sociopathy" (Speilberger, Kling, & 
O'Hagen, 1978, pp. 23-24). Each term has descriptive cri-
teria which focus on different aspects of psychopathy. This 
vast sea of labels and descriptions are a good example of 
the confusion which surrounds the concept of psychopathy. 
The confusion of terms has led several authors to 
consider the concept of psychopathy as a wastebasket cate-
7 
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gory (Karpman, 1948; Lewis, 1974; Robbins, 1967) which has 
never been clearly defined and "is in fact an empirically 
non-existent entity" (Rotenberg, 1978, p. 187). The con-
cept of psychopathy according to Rotenberg (1975), lacks 
consensus among legal and medical professionals concerning 
its nature and probably its very existence. Rotenberg 
(1975) further observed that the diagnosis of psychopathy 
is also used to identify the "untreatable" cases. The con-
cept's vagueness and its use to identify the "incurable" 
has made psychopathy a dangerous label, according to Roten-
berg (1975), because it perpetuates a myth of the "big, 
bad psychopath." Research, theory, and treatment possibil-
ities then become shrouded by this myth. 
However, McCord and McCord (1956) maintained that 
much of the difficulty with definition [of psychop-
athy] • • • has . • . been superficial and overly 
stressed. Below their surface argument, most social 
scientists postulate a common core of psychopathy with 
which all would agree: The psychopath is an asocial, 
aggressive, highly impulsive person, who feels little 
or no guilt and is unable to form lasting bonds of af-
fection with other human beings. (p. 2) 
Duff (1977) also suggested that the concept of psychopathy 
has a legitimate use because "it can be used to identify a 
kind of disorder not captured by the more widely accepted 
• • • diagnostic . criteria" (p. 189) . The ps~chopath, 
according to Duff (1977), cannot be considered disabled be-
cause of a deficiency in the intellectual capacity for 
reasoning nor for an incapacity "to control one's actions, 
9 
and resist contrary impulses, in the light of one's ra-
tional purposes" (p. 189). Rather, the psychopath suffers 
from an inability to experience "such emotional and moral 
responses as love, remorse, and concern for others" (Duff, 
1977, p. 191). It is his inability to share in this dimen-
sion of the human experience which blocks his ability to 
reasonably understand his actions and the actions of others. 
His inability 
to participate in a significant dimension of human 
life and thought, which includes both moral concepts 
and values and conceptions of self-interest, of emo-
tion, and of concerns other than the strictly moral 
(Duff, 1977, p. 199) 
is the unique characteristic identified by the concept of 
psychopathy and gives this concept an important position 
in the diagnostic nomenclature. 
Following McCord and McCord (1956) and Duff (1957), 
this paper considers psychopathy as an important concept 
for mental health practitioners. An examination of clin-
ical descriptions, diagnostic criteria, empirical measure-
ment and selected research in psychopathy follows. However, 
an attempt to focus on the unique quality of the concept of 
psychopathy as described by Duff (1977) and mirrored in the 
McCord and McCord (1956) definition quoted above is of pri-
mary importance and reflected in the material selected for 
review. 
Clinical descriptions. Currently, the American 
10 
Psychiatric Association refers to the concept of psychop-
athy in the diagnostic category of antisocial personality 
(Cleckley, 1976). The antisocial personality is defined in 
the second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 
1968) as follows: 
The term is reserved for individuals who are basically 
unsocialized and whose behavior pattern brings them 
repeatedly into conflict with society. They are in-
capable of significant loyalty to individuals, groups, 
or social values. They are grossly selfish, callous, 
irresponsible, and unable to feel guilt or to learn 
from experience and punishment. Frustration tolerance 
is low. They tend to blame others or offer plausible 
rationalizations for their behavior. A mere history 
of repeated legal or social offences is not sufficient 
to justify this diagnosis. (p. 43) 
Reid (1978) reported the proposed diagnostic cri-
teria for antisocial personality listed in an early draft 
of DSM III. In order to be diagnosed as an antisocial 
personality in the proposed DSM III an individual must fit 
criteria in five areas. Reid (1978) reported the client 
must: (1) be at least 18 and have a history of violating 
the rights of others; (2) exhibit development of the dis-
order before the age of 15 by demonstrating at least two 
of the following behaviors: truancy, persistent lying, 
contact with juvenile court, stealing, early drinking, run-
ning away, etc.; (3) exhibit after the age of 15, at least 
three of the following: poor work history, felony arrests 
or convictions, repeated stealing, repeated acting out, 
continuous unplanned traveling from place to place, multiple 
11 
divorces or separations, etc.; (4) have no history of be-
having in a socially acceptable manner for more than 5 
years unless institutionalized; and (5) does not fit into 
the diagnostic criteria of schizophrenia or mental retarda-
tion. Reid (1978) also cited the DSM III draft as describ-
ing several additional "essential factors" of the antisocial 
personality which included "a marked impaired capacity to 
retain lasting, close, warm and responsible relationships 
with family, friends, or sexual partners" (cited by Reid, 
1978, p. 5). 
Karpman (1948) suggested that the diagnosis of 
psychopathy be divided into two groupings, the sympto-
matic or secondary psychopathy and the primary or idio-
pathic psychopathy. The secondary psychopath would in-
clude all cases where antisocial acting out was a conse-
quence of psychogenic factors and should be labeled ac-
cording to their proper clinical categories under neurosis 
or psychosis. A majority of the cases now labeled as psycho-
pathic personality would fit into these groupings. The re-
maining idiopathic psychopath group would be characterized 
by some constitutional defect rather than by psychodynamic 
conflicts. Karpman (1948) suggested labeling this group 
as anethopathic and described them as "having in particular 
a virtual absence of any redeeming social reaction: con-
science, guilt, binding and generous emotions, etc., while 
12 
purely egoistic, uninhibited, instinctive trends are pre-
dominant" (p. 533) • 
McCord and McCord (1956) maintained that the two 
main features of psychopathy were guiltlessness and a warped 
capacity for love. The psychopaths' sense of guiltlessness, 
according to McCord and McCord,is what sets them apart from 
normals and other deviants. Even the average criminal has 
developed some set of values for which he can feel a pang 
of guilt or sadness when he violates such values (e.g., the 
criminal code) • The psychopath was also described as very 
cold and compassionless and his ability to exhibit love or 
strong emotional attachment appears incapacitated or never 
developed. 
Ziskind (1978) considered five criteria essential 
for the diagnosis of psychopathy or antisocial behavior. 
These included impulsiveness, superficiality of affect, ir-
responsibility, inability to profit from past experience or 
punishment, and an impaired conscience. Superficiality of 
affect is defined as "the failure of the subject to have 
strong or full loyalties, loves, and empathy, as well as 
strong emotional feelings such as anxiety, guilt, and worry" 
(Ziskind, 1978, p. 51). 
By far the most extensive clinical descriptions of 
the psychopath have been presented by Cleckley (1976). He 
described the psychopath as exhibiting superficial charm 
and good intelligence; absence of delusions and other signs 
13 
of irrational thinking; absence of nervousness or psycho-
neurotic manifestations; unreliability, untruthfulness and 
insincerity; lack of remorse of shame; inadequately moti-
vated antisocial behavior; poor judgment and failure to 
learn from experience; pathological egocentricity and in-
capability for love; general poverty in major affective re-
actions; specific loss of insight; unresponsiveness in 
general interpersonal relations; fantastic and uninviting 
behavior with drink and sometimes without; impersonal, 
trivial, and poorly integrated sex life; and failure to 
follow any life plan. 
Important for this paper are the characteristics 
of egocentricity and emotional poverty reported by Cleek-
ley. The psychopath exhibits a self-centeredness which is 
so complete and extreme that Cleckley considered the psycho-
path to be incapable of any durable, meaningful object love. 
This is reflected in all interpersonal and sexual relation-
ships. The psychopath is further described as exhibiting 
a paucity of genuine affect. Deep grief, anger, joy, or 
true despair are not in the psychopaths realm of emotional 
reaction. Hare (1970) summarized it best by describing the 
psychopath as lacking 
the ability to experience the emotional components of 
personal and interpersonal behavior--he mimics the human 
personality but is unable to really feel. Thus, al-
though his verbalizations (for exampre;-"I'm sorry I 
got you in trouble") appear normal, they are devoid of 
emotional meaning . • • he is unable to show empathy 
or genuine concern for others. (pp. 5-6) 
14 
It is important to note here the consistency found 
across the many authors in describing the psychopath. Each 
of the sources mentioned above described the psychopath in 
some way as egocentric, and as lacking strong affective or 
empathic responsivity. The psychopath's egocentricity and 
impaired emotional responsivity or lack of empathy appear 
to be important variables in considering the concept and 
diagnosis of psychopathy. It is these variables (egocen-
tricity and emotional responsivity) that are explored fur-
ther in relation to psychopathy. 
Types of antisocial behavior. The above descrip-
tions of psychopathy refer to what Hare and Cox (1978a) 
described as "primary" psychopathy. However, there are a 
number of individuals who exhibit antisocial behavior which 
reflects some deep-seated emotional disturbance or conflict. 
Hare and Cox (1978a) reported that the "terms neurotic, 
secondary, or symptomatic psychopathy have been used to 
describe these individuals" (p. 4) because their antisocial 
behavior is a consequence of a neurotic conflict. Accord-
ing to Hare (1970), however, these terms are misleading 
because the motivations behind their behavior, as well 
as their personality structure, life history, response 
to treatment, and prognosis are very different from 
those of the psychopath. Moreover, unlike the psycho-
paths, these individuals experience guilt and remorse 
for their behavior, and are able to form meaningful, 
affectional relationships with others. (p. 8) 
Hare (1970, 1975) preferred to use terms such as acting-
15 
out neurotic or neurotic delinquent which stress the neu-
rotic element in their behavior rather than their similar-
ities to psychopaths. 
It is important to note here that if the secondary 
psychopaths or neurotic delinquents exhibit the ability to 
develop meaningful emotional relationships then neurotic 
delinquents may also show more empathic ability than primary 
psychopaths. Acting out neurotics may also exhibit less 
egocentric qualities and be better at role-taking than the 
primary psychopaths. 
Another form of antisocial behavior occurs as a re-
sult of having been raised in a deviant subculture. While 
the behavior exhibited by the individual raised in such a 
subculture is considered normal by this group, it may be 
considered deviant by society in general. So, when this 
deviant subgroup exhibits antisocial behavior, it is not 
due to an internal conflict or an emotional deficit, but, 
it occurs because their environment rewards deviant be-
havior. This group is capable of developing normal emo-
tional relationships given a different social environment. 
This group has been described as dysocial psychopaths 
(Hare & Cox, 1978a) and subcultural delinquents (Quay & 
Peterson, Note 4) • 
The above descriptions of primary, neurotic, and 
dysocial psychopathy are based upon clinical observation and 
are difficult to define in an empirical way. However, 
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several studies have succeeded in empirically determining 
factors, dimensions, or typologies which bear out the clin-
ical descriptions of psychopathy. Hare and Cox (1978a) re-
ported an unpublished investigation which analyzed prison 
inmates on 14 variables which included a clinical rating 
of psychopathy and scores from personality inventories 
measuring psychopathy, impulsivity, empathy, trait anxiety, 
socialization, sensation seeking, depression, mania, and 
schizophrenia. Two clusters were discovered which cor-
responded to the concepts of primary and secondary psychop-
athy. The cluster corresponding most closely to primary 
psychopathy included high clinical ratings of psychopathy, 
a low socialization score and high scores on impulsivity 
and sensation seeking. The cluster consistent with neu-
rotic delinquency included high scores of trait anxiety 
and on the Depression, Schizophrenia, and Psychopathic 
Deviate subscales of the MMPI. 
Using self-report data (Peterson, Quay, & Cameron, 
1959; Peterson, Quay, & Tiffany, 1961; Quay & Cameron, 
1958), case-history data (Quay, 1966), and behavior ratings 
(Quay, 1964), Quay and his associates have isolated several 
factors related to delinquency. The factors isolated have 
been labeled psychopathic delinquency, neurotic-disturbed, 
subcultural delinquency, and inadequate-immature (Quay & 
Parsons, 1971). Quay (1972) summarized items associated 
with each of the factors over the course of his research. 
17 
The psychopathic delinquency factor is associated with ag-
gressive, antisocial behavior, guiltlessness, distrust of 
authority, and impulsive behavior. The neurotic delin-
quency factor is associated with feelings of distrust, fear, 
anxiety, physical complaints, withdrawal, and open and ex-
pressed unhappiness. The third factor, derived from case 
history data and behavior ratings, "represents behavior 
which is neither generally a source of personal distress nor 
clearly maladaptive when one considers the social conditions 
under which it seems to arise" (Quay, 1972, p. 14). Be-
haviors, such as staying out late at night, truancy, en-
gaging in gang activity or cooperative stealing, and ex-
hibiting a strong loyalty to selected peers, are associated 
with the subcultural delinquency factor. The inadequate-
immature factor is associated with a short attention span, 
clUmsiness, furtive stealing, incompetence, preoccupied 
attitude, and general immaturity. The inadequate-immature 
factor has not appeared in all the factor analytic studies 
and is, therefore, not as reliable as the other factors 
(Quay & Peterson, Note 1). From the factors discovered 
and analyzed by Quay and his associates several scales have 
been developed for use with juvenile delinquents which will 
be covered in more detail later. 
A study reported by Widom (1978) adds further sup-
port for the distinction between neurotic psychopathy and 
primary psychopathy. She studied 66 women, with a history 
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of previous offenses, awaiting trial in a correctional 
facility. Using their scores on the Special Hospital 
Assessment of Personality and Socialization inventory, 
developed by Blackburn (1975), four personality types 
were discovered upon cluster analysis of the scores. The 
first type included women who exhibited hostility, aggres-
siveness, impulsivity, little anxiety, and appeared under-
socialized. Widom tentatively labeled this type the primary 
psychopathy group. The second type was also described 
as aggressive, impulsive, and undersocialized but with 
extreme anxiety and depression. This type was labeled as 
secondary or neurotic psychopaths. The third type was de-
scribed as exhibiting extremely low scores on anxiety, 
hostility, tension, depression, and psychopathy scales, but 
demonstrated a high lie score on the inventory. As a con-
sequence, Widom suggested this type could be characterized 
by patterns of extreme denial and control. This type was 
labeled overcontrolled. The fourth type was characterized 
as a normal criminal with little or no personality path-
ology. 
Blackburn (1979) also reported similar factors 
using the self-report Special Hospital Assessment of Per-
sonality and Socialization inventory and behavior ratings 
with two samples of male offenders. The factor analysis of 
the self-report data for both samples brought out a psy-
chopathy versus conformity factor and a social withdrawal 
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versus sociability factor. The first factor had high load-
ings on the impulsivity, aggression, hostility, extra-
version, psychopathic deviant scales and loaded negatively 
on the lie scales. The second factor is delineated mainly 
by its high loadings on an introversion-shyness scale but 
also by high loadings on the anxiety, tension, and depres-
sion scales. A high negative loading on the extraversion 
scales was also noted. Similar higher order factors were 
reported from the behavior ratings of one of the samples 
of offenders. The first factor, described as psychopathy 
or antisocial aggression "reflects assaultive, quarrelsome, 
and a rebellious behavior versus conformity to ward routine" 
(p. 114). The second factor was described as withdrawal 
versus sociability and "contrasts isolation, inactivity, 
and withdrawal with social spontaneity and interaction" 
(p. 114) • Although the content of the factors appeared 
similar between both methods of measurement, only the psy-
chopathy factor correlated significantly across methods for 
both medicated and unmedicated patients at admission. Also, 
a significant correlation for unmedicated subjects between 
the withdrawal-sociability factor from the self-report in-
ventory and the social withdrawal factor from a behavior 
rating was attained two years after admission. Although 
the correlation between methods for the withdrawal-soci-
ability factor were not always significant, the existence 
of a psychopatlricfactor and a factor based on anxiety, 
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tension, and depression is consistent with the other studies 
and further suggests the expediency of having both primary 
and secondary psychopathy categories. 
Both clinical observation and factor analytic 
studies of antisocial populations stress the existence of 
several personality types comprising the acting-out popula-
tion. Two of the most prevalent factors found across sev-
eral studies can be described by the two types of psychop-
athy observed by Hare (1970) which are labeled primary psy-
chopathy and secondary psychopathy or acting out neurotic. 
Both groups exhibit impulsive, aggressive acting out but 
the neurotic group has been associated with more emotional 
responsivity. The acting out neurotic is characterized by 
feelings of guilt, remorse, and high levels of anxiety. 
This greater degree of affective responsiveness suggests 
that the neurotic psychopath may respond better to treat-
ment and be better able to form attachments to others than 
the psychopath. However, the neurotic is also typified by 
withdrawal. The neurotic may withdraw because interper-
sonal relations are too arousing and he controls this by 
staying away. 
Measurement of psychopathy for research. Hare 
and Cox (1978a) in a review of subject selection tech-
niques for research concerned with psychopathy, reported a 
variety of selection procedures including self-report in-
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ventories, global ratings, and checklists. Each method 
reportedly measures the concept of psychopathy, however, 
Hare and Cox (1978a) suggested that many of these methods 
may not be selecting the same subjects as psychopaths. 
Hundleby and Ross (1977) examined six of the most commonly 
used self-report inventories for measuring psychopathy in 
order to determine whether they measure the same concept. 
The inventories included were the revised Activity Pref-
erence Questionnaire, the Sixteen Personality Factor Ques-
tionnaire, the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire, the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the Sensation 
Seeking Scale, and the Personal Opinion Study. Each in-
ventory was completed by all or part of a sample of 397 
inmates of a federal prison. Hundleby_and Ross concluded, 
after a factor analysis, that these self-report inventories 
were not all measuring the same concept and would lead to 
selecting different subjects as psychopaths. 
The self-report method is also subject to consider-
able faking. Subjects wishing to portray a certain pattern 
of behavior or report a socially acceptable picture could 
easily do it undetected with most of the self-report psy-
chopathy measures. Considering the faking issues and what 
Hundleby and Ross (1977) reported, it would be difficult to 
choose a self-report measure for research in psychopathy 
because one is not really sure exactly what the scale is 
measuring. 
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Hare (1978) reported considerable success in 
choosing homogeneous samples of psychopaths with a global 
rating method. Hare related the belief that a global 
rating of psychopathy based upon Cleckley's criterion of 
psychopathy, case history analysis, and interviews would 
be the method of selection which is most closely related 
to current clinical conceptions of psychopathy. In the 
global method described by Hare (1975), the researcher 
first discusses the Cleckley criteria of psychopathy with 
the institutional staff and selects names of patients who 
fit the criteria. Next, the researcher obtains whatever 
information is available on the patient. From these data, 
the researcher rates on a 7-point scale whether the patient 
fits or does not fit the psychopathy criteria. Using this 
method, Hare and Cox (1978a) reported interrater reli-
ability coefficients ranging from .80 to .90 with experi-
enced judges. Using a checklist of Cleckley (1976) cri-
teria rated on 7-point scales, Siegel (1978) reported test-
related reliability correlations of .85 and interrater re-
liability of .72 for male sex offenders. Rime, Bouvy, 
Leborgne, and Rouillon (1978) reported interjudge relia-
bility of .68 on a checklist of 18 items based on Cleckley 
(1976) and McCord and McCord (1964) criter~a. 
Although considerable success with global ratings 
has been reported, there are some problems mentioned by 
Hare and Cox (1978a), in using this method. One of the 
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first problems is that the method is dependent upon ex-
tensive historical and behavioral data which may not be 
available for many criminal or noncriminal subject popu-
lations. Secondly, the "global ratings of psychopathy are 
based primarily upon evidence-of a consistent pattern of 
behavior over a long period of time" (Hare & Cox, 1978a, 
p. 9). This type of evidence may not be available for 
younger subjects who have not yet established chronic be-
havior patterns. Finally, this method is open to consider-
able error, such as the rater's professional experience 
or knowledge about the concept of psychopathy. 
Psychopathy measures which are more empirical, re-
liable, applicable to many different situations, and which 
do not require extensive background tr~ining to complete 
are the Behavioral Problem Checklist {Quay, 1964; Quay, 
19~6; Quay & Peterson, Note 1) used with young offenders 
and the Correctional Adjustment Checklist {Quay, Note 2) 
for adult offenders. Subjects rated with the Behavior 
Problem Checklist are rated on a range of behaviors inclu-
ding such things as restlessness, irritability, crying, 
withdrawal, attention span, and drowsiness. Behavior 
Problem Checklist ratings have been completed by teachers 
(Eaves, 1975; Proger, Mann, Green, Bayuk, & Burger, 1975; 
Quay, Galvin, Annesley, & Werry, 1972; Schultz, Salvia, 
& Feinn, 1973) , parole officers (Mack, 1969) , and correc-
tional institution staff (Schuck, Dubeck, Cyrnbalisty, & 
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Green, 1972) • These ratings have been completed in a number 
of different situations including public schools (Schultz 
et al., 1973) and residential treatment facilities (Schuck 
et al., 1972). 
The Behavior Problem Checklist items have been 
factor analyzed into the four factors mentioned above. 
Items for each factor have been grouped into four different 
subscales which coincide with the factor groupings. These 
scales include (a) conduct problem scale or psychopathic 
delinquency factor, (b) the personality problem scale or 
neurotic delinquency factor, (c) the inadequate-immature 
scale or factor, and (d) the socialized delinquency scale 
or dysocial psychopath factor. Interrater reliability of 
the checklist ratings were reviewed by Quay and Peterson 
(Note 1) and ranged from .58 to .83 for the conduct problem 
scale, and from .22 to .75 for the personality problem scale. 
The lower reliability coefficients were obtained in studies 
where raters had little contact with the subjects or un-
equal amounts of contact (i.e., parent-teachers). 
Quay (1972) suggested that due to the behavior as-
sociated with individuals scoring high on the conduct 
problem scale or on the personality problem scale, these 
scales appear to be measures of primary and secondary psy-
chopathy respectively. Individuals scoring high on the 
conduct problem scale have been labeled "psychopathic de-
linquents" (Peterson et al., 1959) and unsocialized psy-
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chopaths (Quay, 1964). High scorers on the conduct prob-
lem scale would be expected to be similar to those psycho-
paths described by Cleckley (1976) and exhibit such behavior 
as egocentricity, untruthfulness, and a lack of anxiety, re-
morse, or empathy. High scores on the personality problem 
scale have been described as secondary psychopaths or 
neurotic delinquents (Hare & Cox, 1978a). Such individuals 
have been associated with some degree of impulsive acting 
out but also "with tension, guilt, remorse, depression, and 
discouragement" (Hare & Cox, 1978, p. 5). Individuals 
scoring high on the personality problem subscale would be 
expected to be more emotionally responsive, more able to 
develop meaningful interpersonal relationships, and be less 
egocentric than high conduct problem scale scorers. 
Several lines of research have added support to the 
above expectations for adolescents rated high on the con-
duct problem and personality problem subscales. Mack (1969) 
investigated the Behavior Problem Checklist ratings for two 
groups of male offenders who differed on their rate of 
recidivism. Recidivists were rated significantly higher on 
the conduct problem scale than non-recidivists. Psycho-
paths would be expected to be more impulsive and get into 
more trouble with the law. Borkovec (1970) examined dif-
ferences in automonic reactivity between these groups of 
juvenile offenders which included high conduct problem 
scorers, high personality problem scorers, and those who 
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scored low on both subscales. High conduct problem 
scorers exhibited significantly lower skin conductance 
response to an auditory stimulus. Hare (1978) has re-
ported similar findings concerning psychopathic prisoners 
which will be summarized later. 
Schuck et al. (1972) investigated the relationship 
between guilt, neuroticism, extroversion, and level of 
institutional adjustment to the four Quay (1966) factors 
mentioned above. In this study, the Case History Scale, 
Personal Opinion Inventory, and the Behavior Problem Check-
list were used to measure the four factors. Subjects rated 
high on the Behavior Problem Checklist psychopathy factor 
and neurotic delinquency factor exhibited no significant 
correlation with guilt measures. Neur~tic delinquents 
were expected to exhibit more guilt. Schuck et al. (1972) 
suggested that the neurotic factor did not measure "the 
presence of internalized value systems and guilt" (p. 225). 
However, psychopathic delinquents were found to exhibit 
more aggressive behavior and a poorer adjustment within an 
institution than neurotic delinquents. This would be ex-
pected if this factor actually measures psychopathy. 
Jurkovic and Prentice (1977) examined psycho-
pathic, neurotic and socialized delinquents and their 
levels of moral and cognitive development. Psychopathic 
delinquents were found to exhibit significantly lower levels 
of moral development than both of the other delinquent 
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groupings and a nondelinquent control group. Psychopathic 
delinquents and neurotic delinquents also exhibited poorer 
cognitive role-taking ability as measured with the nickel 
and dime procedure (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 
1968} than controls or subcultural delinquents. These re-
sults coincide with Gough's (1948} theory of psychopathy 
examined later in the text. 
Akamatsy and Farudi (1978} investigated differ-
ences among delinquent subgroups in responding to modeling. 
Subjects categorized as immature-inadequate delinquents 
were more responsive to staff modeling than peer modeling 
conditions. 
In summarizing these findings, the above studies 
suggest, first, that the Behavior Problem Checklist is 
successful in dividing a delinquent population into mean-
ingful subtypes which can be shown to perform differently 
on a number of tasks. Secondly, and probably more im-
portant for this study, is that two of the subtypes appear 
to categorize primary and secondary psychopathy. Subjects 
fitting into the psychopathic delinquent group have demon-
strated poor moral development, poor cognitive role-taking 
abilities, less autonomic responsivity, and more recidivism. 
However, none of the above studies investigated what has 
been suggested in this paper, as a very important element 
of psychopathy (empathy} • If the role-taking measure in 
the Jurkovic and Prentice (1977} study is considered a 
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measure of egocentrism or empathy, then this study could 
lend support to the notion that psychopaths, as measured 
by the Behavior Problem Checklist, do exhibit more ego-
centrism and less empathy than a normal control group. But 
the neurotic delinquents also did poorly on such tasks. 
Further investigation into psychopathic delinquency and 
its relation to empathy and egocentrism is important to fur-
ther validation of this subscale. 
The neurotic delinquent does not always react as 
would be predicted from clinical theory (Schuck et al., 
1972) • This may occur because the Behavior Problem Check-
list does not measure neurotic delinquency well, or there 
may have been problems with the measures used by Schuck et 
al. (1972). Further investigation into this subtype as 
measured by the Behavior Problem Checklist needs to be com-
pleted. 
Theories of psychopathy. Up to now, the focus has 
been on describing psychopathy and its measurement. Very 
little has been mentioned about what social scientists be-
lieve motivates the psychopath to act in the manner he does. 
The two most prominent theories used to explain psycho-
pathic behavior are the physiological explanation of psy-
chopathy and the social role explanation of psychopathy. 
1. Physiological explanations: The physiological 
explanations of psychopathy have attempted to establish 
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differences between psychopaths and comparison groups in 
cortical activities, autonomic activities, and arousal 
levels (Hare, 1970) . The following is only meant to high-
light some of theresearchfindings for each of these areas. 
For more detailed treatment of the material, the reader is 
referred to the excellent reviews of physiological corre-
lates of psychopathy found in Hare (1970, 1975, 1978) and 
Smith (1978). 
Studies investigating electrocortical activity in 
psychopaths have focused mainly on electroencephalogram 
(EEG) measures of cortical activity. In a review of EEG 
studies with psychopaths, Syndulko (1978) suggested "that 
psychopaths show a higher incidence of EEG abnormalities 
than do controls, but not necessarily higher than the in-
cidence in other psychiatric groups" (p. 148). However, 
the EEG studies are not all consistent with the above con-
clusion. Smith (1978) cites a review of EEG studies con-
cerning psychopathy by Gale which concluded that "EEG re-
search has been ambiguous, correlational, and better ex-
ecuted on the negative (findings) side than the positive" 
(p. 51). Syndulko (1978) suggested that even though EEG 
studies are not consistent and slow-wave brain activity 
may or may not describe the psychopath, the mere incidence 
of abnormal EEG patternsis uninformative because EEG ab-
normalities "have not been successfully related to any 
other relevant data about the sociopath" (p. 150), such as 
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prognosis, treatment, or any sociological-psychological 
aspect of the psychopath. Syndulko concluded that EEG 
studies bent on investigating the incidence of abnormal 
patterns rather than using more sophisticated methods of 
EEG study, such as profile analysis, would continue to ex-
hibit inconsistent meaningless results. 
Attempts to explain clinical descriptions of the 
psychopath as guiltless, lacking anxiety or empathy, and 
exhibiting poor interpersonal relationships have also 
focused on differences in autonomic nervous system func-
tioning as a causal factor. Hare (1970) has even sug-
gested 
that the psychopath's lack of empathy may be assoc-
iated with an inability to give appropriate autonomic 
responses to the suffering and distress of others and 
to situations involving the interpersonal exchange of 
love, affection, cruelty, and so forth (p. 49). 
Autonomic research with psychopaths has focused primarily 
on electrodermal (skin conductance) and cardiovascular 
activity (heart rate, pulse amplitude) (Hare, 1978). These 
studies have focused on autonomic activity during rest 
periods of experimental procedures, in response to a simple 
stimulus, and in classical conditioning paradigms where an 
aversive stimulus is anticipated by a warning signal or con-
ditional stimulus. 
Research focusing on autonomic activity during ex-
perimental rest periods has found no consistent differ-
ences between psychopathic and other inmates in cardio-
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vascular activity (Hare, 1978). Electrodermal studies have 
also been inconsistent, but this may be due to the dif-
ferent methods of selecting psychopaths and the possibil-
ity that skin conductance may not only be affected by emo-
tional factors (lack of anxiety) but also to differences 
in cognitive activity and emotional factors brought to the 
experimental procedure (Hare, 1978). In well controlled 
studies with adequate subject selection procedures, psy-
chopaths have been found to exhibit lower skin conductance 
than others during an initial resting period (Hare & Cox, 
1978b). 
Autonomic activity measured in response to a simple 
stimulus such as an electric shock or noise has shown dif-
ferent patterns of results for electrodermal and cardio-
vascular studies. In summarizing cardiovascular studies 
concerning cardiovascular responses to an unsignalled 
stimulus, Hare & Cox (1978b) suggested that psychopaths 
do not differ from others in this aspect of autonomic func-
tioning. However, Hare & Cox (1978b) reported that research 
concerned with the electrodermal response to an unsignalled 
stimulus has usually found the psychopaths responding with 
smaller skin conductance activity than others. 
The most significant and consistent result in 
studying autonomic activity and psychopathy has been re-
ported in studies utilizing a classical conditioning para-
digm. In this experimental procedure, psychopathic inmates, 
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in comparison with other inmates, show less electrodermal 
activity while awaiting the forewarned stimulus and have 
shown an increased heart rate while anticipating the aver-
sive stimulus (Hare & Cox, 1978b) • The lowered electro-
dermal activity and increased-heart rate have been "hypo-
thesized to reflect the operation of an active, efficient 
coping process, and the inhibition of fear arousal" (Hare 
& Cox, 1978b, p. 219) . This process has the result of 
dampening the emotional impact of the experimental stimulus 
for the psychopath. 
House and Milligan (1976) demonstrated this lowered 
responsiveness to emotional impact in a study which ex-
amined autonomic activity in response to seeing a confed-
erate given either low or high shocks._ Prison subjects 
scoring high on the Psychopathic Deviate scale of the MMPI 
and low on an anxiety test (primary psychopaths) exhibited 
significantly less skin resistance than the neurotic psy-
chopathic and nonpsychopathic groups. The heart rate 
measure exhibited no significant difference for psychopathy 
groups, or observed distress level. House and Milligan con-
cluded that psychopaths are affectively (autonomically) less 
responsive than nonpsychopaths and that this coincides with 
clinical descriptions. 
Research examining autonomic activity in psycho-
paths has been relatively successful in discovering a dif-
ference in autonomic response patterns. This difference 
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has been used to explain the lack of empathy, lack of anxi-
ety, impulsivity, inability to tolerate boredom, and poor 
interpersonal relationships exhibited by psychopaths. Smith 
(1978) however, disagreed with this explanation, arguing 
that such an explanation defined feeling as an autonomic 
response and negated "the possibility of having a 'feeling' 
at odds with one's ANS state" (p. 51). Smith further ob-
served that the poor relationship between objective and 
subjective measures of anxiety reported in many studies was 
a good argument against equating feelings with an autonomic 
response. Autonomic differences may also be related to 
differences in cognitive styles or motivational styles. 
So, although there is a demonstrated difference in autonomic 
functioning between psychopaths and nonpsychopaths, it is 
very speculative as to how it actually relates to clinically 
observable behavior. 
2. Social-Role Theory: Gough (1948) has postulated 
an explanation of psychopathy which is based upon the socio-
logical theory of Mead (1934). According to Gough, the psy-
chopath is lacking in role-taking skills. Role-taking is 
the ability to put oneself into another's place and to ex-
perience the other's point of view. The process of role-
taking is considered an imaginative process and is not 
necessarily concerned with physically playing or acting out 
the other's roles. Role-taking is considered an integral 
part of the normal socialization process by which an indi-
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vidual begins to learn others' perspectives, intentions, 
and behavior. Through role-taking, others' perceptions of 
oneself are experienced and take on importance. These out-
side perspectives or viewpoints which the individual en-
counters and imagines, begin to become internalized and a 
sense of self develops. Through role-taking, the individual 
also learns social cooperation, self-control, and a concep-
tion of the social community. 
If an individual is deficient or lacks the ability 
to experience another's perspective, then the socialization 
process becomes disrupted. The psychopath, without role-
taking skills, would not be able to judge his own behavior 
from another's perspective, could not learn to predict what 
effect his behavior would have on others, and would not ex-
perience loyalty, embarassment, shame, or guilt (Hare, 
1970). The psychopath's sense of self would not develop 
socially and would be very egocentrically oriented. With-
out the ability to identify with others' perspectives, the 
psychopath would not be able to appreciate others' feelings, 
would not develop prohibitions against socially unacceptable 
behavior, and would probably not be able to develop close 
interpersonal relationships (Hare, 1970). 
Gough's (1948) theory of psychopathy has received 
support from several experimental studies (Berg, 1974; 
Chandler, 1973b; Reed & Cuadra, 1957; Widom, 1976). Reed 
and Cuadra (1957) examined psychopathy ratings, self-
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descriptions, descriptions of others, and predictions of 
how others would describe the individual for a group of 
student nurses. Student nurses scoring high on the psy-
chopathy scale were significantly less able than low scor-
ing nurses to predict how others would describe them and 
were described by others as being less aware of the social 
consequences of their behavior and of what others thought 
about them. 
Berg (1974) studied the self-concept, ideal self-
concept, and self-ideal discrepancy for psychopaths and a 
neurotic group. Ideal self-concepts were the same for both 
groups, while self-concepts and self-ideal discrepancies 
were significantly different for both groups. The psycho-
pathic group exhibited less discrepancy from ideal concept 
and "described themselves as daring, adventurous, clear-
thinking, outspoken, warmhearted, and unselfish" (p. 622). 
The neurotic group exhibited the biggest discrepancy from 
the ideal concept and "described themselves as nervous, 
anxious, high-strung, immature, hurried and worried" 
(p. 622). Others' ratings of self were not included in 
this study which makes it impossible to say with any cer-
tainty which of the two groups displayed self-ideal dis-
crepancy. However, it could be argued that one would ex-
pect the psychopath to have less self~ideal discrepancy be-
cause he has not internalized others' views concerning his 
self, so he is less likely to rate himself lower. It is 
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important to point out that the psychopathic and neurotic 
groups do exhibit different self-concepts which could also 
come from a difference in role-taking skills as postulated 
by Gough (1948) and may be important to consider when study-
ing neurotic and primary psychopaths. 
Widom (1976) studied primary psychopaths, secondary 
psychopaths, and a normal control group on their perspec-
tives of different interpersonal situations. Subjects 
rated 30 different interpersonal situations according to 10 
value constructs they supplied themselves and 8 which were 
supplied by the experimenter. The subjects were asked to 
complete the ratings twice, once as they themselves would 
rate the situations and once as they thought people in gen-
eral would rate the situations. Both of the psychopathy 
groups exhibited extreme differences on their ratings of 
people in general with the people in general ratings of the 
control group. For example, the psychopathy groups rated 
people in general as feeling good about cooperating with 
someone when you think they have taken advantage of you 
(82.35 percent of the primary psychopaths and 58.82 percent 
of the secondary psychopaths checked this item). Only 25 
percent of the control group rated people in general as 
feeling good about such a situation. 
This discrepancy suggests that psychopaths do not 
understand interpersonal situations in the same manner as 
society at large. Primary. psychopaths appear to have the 
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most idiosyncratic or eccentric understanding. Even more 
important is the fact that the primary psychopaths' per-
sonal ratings were very consistent with their ratings of 
people in general. Widom (1976) suggested this occurred 
because the primary psychopaths "do not think other people 
think differently, and hence, they make little effort to 
modify their own construct system" (p. 622). If psychopaths 
have a role-taking deficit, then they would be expected to 
understand interpersonal situations differently than people 
in general. The inability to step out of one's self could 
also lead to an over-evaluation of one's own opinions, 
thoughts, and feeling, or a high level of egocentricity. 
This could explain the assigning of personal values to the 
people in general and the inability to see any discrepancy 
between the two. 
Chandler (1973a, 1973b) and Chandler, Greenspan, 
and Barenboim (1974) have indirectly exhibited support for 
the role-taking hypothesis of psychopathy from a develop-
mental perspective. In the cognitive developmental per-
spective, the development of role-taking skills can be con-
ceptualized as progression from a condition of extreme ego-
centric or highly personal point of view to a condition of 
perspectivism (Langer, 1969). Using a Piagetian develop-
mental perspective, Chandler (1977) defined some of the 
concepts underlying his research. Chandler (1977) described 
the ability to take the role of the other ..• as a 
special case of a more fundamental capacity to decenter 
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or departicularize the focus of one's conceptual activi-
ties and simultaneously to consider and coordinate two 
or more points of view. The term "egocentrism" is ap-
plied to that state of recurrent subject-object confu-
sion which operates to confine an individual to a sin-
gular and highly personalized point of view while deny-
ing to the other the uniqueness of their own vantage. 
Perspectivism~ on the other hand, refers to the progres-
sive capacity to differentiate between one's own and 
other's points of view. (p. 110-111) 
Under conditions of normal socialization, a child is charac-
terized by a decrease in egocentric orientation and an in-
crease in social decentering skills. However, under condi-
tions where deviant socialization seems to have occurred, 
role-taking skills or decentering ability would be deficient 
and an egocentric perspective would prevail. 
Chandler (1973b) and Chandler et al. (1974) in-
vestigated role-taking skills in a group of delinquent 
adolescents. Using a series of cartoon sequences as a 
measure of egocentrism, Chandler (1973b) and Chandler et al. 
(1974) reported both a group of delinquent boys and a group 
of emotionally disturbed boys as exhibiting deficits in 
role-taking skills. Training in role-taking skills was 
also reported to improve perspective-taking skills which 
were associated with decreased delinquent activity (Chand-
ler, 1973b) and improved social adjustment (Chandler et al. 
1974) upon follow up. Although psychopaths were not di-
rectly identified in these studies, the fact that a group 
of delinquents which probably included some psychopaths was 
39 
found deficient in role-taking skills does add further sup-
port for Gough's theory. 
Gough (1948) characterized the deficient role-
taking skills of the psychopath as essentially a lack of 
empathy. However, Smith (1978) suggested that this does 
not fit well with the clinical observations of the psycho-
path. If the psychopath is postulated to "suffer a basic 
failure of empathy" (p. 62) , then how can he also be an 
excellent manipulator of people, as some observers have 
noted (Cleckley, 1976)? Smith argued that in order to 
manipulate others, one must be able to judge others'be-
havior, know what they want, and sense what they are ex-
periencing. If the psychopath can do all that is necessary 
to manipulate, then how can he also be a poor role-taker? 
Hare (1970) suggested that what the psychopath may 
be good at is the cognitive components of empathy. The 
psychopath has learned and can understand the socially ap-
propriate manner of thinking about situations (although 
Widom's [1976] research might disagree with this). However, 
the psychopath is described as lacking "the emotional com-
ponents of personal and interpersonal behavior" (Hare, 
1970, p. 5). So, the psychopath may be able to handle the 
cognitive aspects of interpersonal relations, but is unable 
to experience the emotional components. 
The above hypothesis also corresponds with the auto-
nomic research mentioned above. There the psychopath's 
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different autonomical responsivity was viewed as an emo-
tional underarousal. The psychopath's inability to experi-
ence the affective side of interpersonal relationships may 
be related to his inappropriate autonomic functioning. 
Ax (1962) suggested that the psychopath's improper 
autonomic functioning may be due to a preoccupation or over-
involvement with the self (egocentrism). This would be re-
lated to Chandler's (1977) developmental approach to role-
taking skills. The more one is preoccupied with egocentric 
concerns, the less willing or able one is to experience the 
total perspective of another. · This total perspective in-
cludes the emotional aspects of the interpersonal relation-
ships and is shown by the psychopath's low autonomic re-
sponsivity to outside stimuli. It is that pathological 
egocentricity and failure in empathy which Buss (1966) 
described as the reason for the psychopath's poor inter-
personal relationships. If the psychopath is unable or un-
willing to experience the affective aspect of another's 
role but can grasp the cognitive aspects of the situation, 
then the psychopath can manipulate others to fulfill his 
needs without concern over experiencing guilt, shame, sor-
row, or embarassment. 
Clark (1980) addressed the relationship between em-
pathy and egocentrism. Empathy, according to Clark, is 
"the capacity of an individual to feel the needs, the as-
pirations, the frustrations, the joys, the sorrows, the 
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anxieties, the hurt, indeed the hunger of others as if they 
were his or her own •.. and is the .•. very opposite of 
rigid egocentricity"(p. 188). He also described different 
levels of empathy and its relationship to egocentrism. The 
totally empathic person experiences others' affects as his 
own and is driven to assist and support. At the other end 
of the extreme is the egocentric psychopath who, 
lacking a modicum of functional empathy, is free of the 
need for realistic moral accomodations and is free of 
ethical anxieties, conflicts, and guilt. He or she 
functions in terms of sheer personal and immediate 
gratification. (Clark, 1980, p. 189) 
The psychopath, then, can be described as an indi-
vidual with a lack of emotional responsivity and an in-
ability to decenter or take another's perspective without 
his or her own immediate needs or concerns intruding into 
the perspective. The psychopath's role-taking ability 
would be blunted by this egocentric concern and inability 
to experience another's affect. The present study had as a 
primary purpose the examination of the relationship between 
perspective-taking skills and emotional empathy in psycop-
athy. 
Empathy Measures and Psychopathy 
The term empathy has often been used to describe 
"the responsiveness of an individual to the feelings of 
another person" (Iannotti, 1975, p. 22). Empathy is "con-
sidered to be a critical determinant of social transactions" 
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(Feshbach, 1978, p. 2). Empathy has been posited to be im-
portant to the effectiveness of psychotherapy (Rogers, 1957), 
inhibition of aggressive behavior (Mehrabian & Epstein, 
1972), attribution of responsibility (Fiske, Taylor, Etcoff, 
& Laufer, 1979), and as a motivating emotion behind such 
prosocial behaviors as generosity (Rushton, 1976) and help-
ing behavior (Hoffman, 1975). However, research on empathy 
is difficult to integrate because the conceptual and opera-
tional definitions of empathy are quite different across 
research projects (Chandler, 1977). 
In a review of selected literature on empathy, 
Chandler (1977) suggested that the many definitions fall 
into three general positions or approaches. The three ap-
proaches can be labeled the (a) affective approach, (b) 
cognitive approach, and (c) cognitive/affective approach 
(Iannotti & Meacham, Note 3). Some of the different empathy 
measures and how they relate to psychopathy will be ex-
amined according to the three types of empathy categories 
mentioned above. 
Emotional empathy. In the affective approach, the 
investigator defines empathy as feeling what another person 
feels and stresses the emotional response of the observer 
over all other aspects of the empathic process (Aronfreed, 
1970; Berger, 1962; Clark, 1980; Feshbach & Roe, 1968; 
Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Stotland, 1969). Investigators 
using the affective definition of empathy have measured 
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empathy through physiological methods (Stotland, 1969), by 
matching observer emotion with the emotion arousing stimuli 
(Feshbach & Roe, 1968), and through questionnaire methods 
(Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). 
Physiological measures of empathy have measured 
skin conductance or the cardiovascular repsonses of a sub-
ject while watching a person undergoing a traumatic or 
highly pleasurable experience (Stotland, 1969). Differ-
ences in autonomic response while observing these confed-
erates are considered measures of empathy. Stotland (1969) 
reported increased palmar sweating in some subjects observ-
ing another person undergo what they thought was a painful 
experience. It is important to note here that psychopaths, 
as mentioned before, have generally exhibited a low level 
of autonomic activity while observing another's distress 
(House & Milligan, 1976). Psychopaths, then could be re-
ported as exhibiting a low level of empathy when using 
physiological methods to measure empathy. 
Hoffman (1977) however, reported several competing 
interpretations of physiological responses. Physiological 
measures "may also reflect a startle reaction to the vic-
tim's bodily movements, an emotional response to the nox-
ious stimulus, • • . or the fear that what happened to the 
other person might also happen to oneself" (p. 713). Hoff 
man's interpretations suggest that it is difficult to know 
exactly what a physiological response actually represents. 
44 
Feshbach (1978) described the development of an 
emotional matching procedure for measuring empathy. Using 
this procedure, a subject is presented with an array of 
slides depicting situations where one of four affects are 
evident (i.e., happiness, sadness, fear, and anger). Im-
mediately following the slides, children were asked how 
they felt. Empathy was defined as a match between the 
child's verbalized affect and the affect portrayed in the 
slide sequence. Correct understanding of what was being 
portrayed on the slides was investigated either after the 
affect inquiry or with a separate group of children. 
Chandler (1977) cited an unpublished report by 
Greenspan which reported several procedural and conceptual 
difficulties with the emotional matchi~g-,·procedure. - One of 
the most important procedural flaws concerned the repeated 
inquiry of feelings. It was suggested that this inquiry 
created extreme demand characteristics which may confound 
the reported results. The emotional matching procedure, 
then, may not actually be measuring empathy but may be 
measuring some level of experimenter demand. 
Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) gathered a set of 
items which were thought to represent different aspects of 
emotional empathy. Subjects were asked to rate themselves 
on 33 items and were then divided into high and low empathy 
groups according to their scale scores. Both groups of sub-
jects were asked to help teach a pupil/confederate by using 
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electric shock to signify errors in the pupil/confederate's 
performance. The confederate was either seated in another 
room or in the immediate vicinity of the subject. Highly 
empathic subjects shocked the immediate victim significantly 
less than the low empathy group. Mehrabian and Epstein con-
cluded that the scale was able to measure affective empathy 
because high scorers were less aggressive in more immediate 
interpersonal situations. Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen (1978) 
have also reported considerable success in using this mea-
sure with normal subjects. 
Aleksic and Savitsky (Note 4) revised the Mehrabian 
and Epstein (1972) questionnaire to read at a fourth-grade 
level and to be answered in a true-false format. The re-
vised questionnaire was then administered to both a de-
linquent and a nondelinquent population. The delinquent 
group scored significantly lower than the nondelinquent 
group. Also, high and low empathy delinquents significantly 
differed in their level of aggressive behavior, with low 
empathy delinquents being much more aggressive. 
Although the above study did not investigate psycho-
pathic and neurotic delinquency directly, it does suggest 
that a measure of emotional empathy can successfully differ-
entiate subgroups of delinquents. These data, along with 
the lowered autonomic responsivity of the psychopath (Hare, 
1978; House & Milligan, 1976) suggest that an affectiv~ 
measure of empathy can be important in studying psychopathy. 
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Considering the problems reported with physiological mea-
sures and the emotional matching procedures, a self-report 
measure seems to be the better method of measurement and 
has worked with psychopaths. For example, Emmons and Webb 
(1974), using a self-report measure of affect, found psy-
chopaths to report "experiencing less overall affect in 
their daily lives than normals or acting-out neurotics" 
(p. 620). In this study, it was hypothesized that psycho-
pathic delinquents exhibit less emotional empathy than 
neurotic delinquents or a comparison delinquency group. 
Cognitive empathy. The cognitive approach defines 
empathy as knowing what another person feels and stresses 
the observer's knowledge about the feeling of another per-
son (Iannotti, Note 5). Investigators using this approach 
have been concerned with whether the observer can accurately 
judge or understand the other person's actions and feelings 
(Dymond, 1950; Truax, 1972), the ability to label or iden-
tify the affect of others (Borke, 1971; Savitsky & 
Czyzewski, 1978), and the role-taking ability of the ob-
server (Chandler, 1977). 
Those subscribing to this latter method, although 
cognitive, do not suggest that empathy is simply the accu~ 
rate judging of emotions in different situations (Chandler 
& Greenspan, 1972). Instead, empathy is suggested to be "a 
special case of role-taking ability" (Chandler, 1977, 
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p. 136) which develops in the same manner as a child's un-
derstanding of the physical world (Feshbach, 1978). What 
becomes important to the empathic response, then, is the 
ability to decenter and understand or share another's per-
spective when it is different -from one's own point of view. 
In this framework, an egocentric perspective, or the in-
ability to decenter, would suggest an inability to make an 
empathic response. 
A considerable amount of research has been com-
pleted on role-taking skills, decentering, and egocentrism 
in children. Good reviews of the literature can be found 
in Chandler (1977), Ford (1979), Kurdek (1978), Looft 
(1972), Rubin (1978), and Shantz (1975). What seems to be 
important in understanding empathy and -role-taking are 
"studies in which the social objects whose points of view 
are in question are engaged in affectively charged inter-
personal interactions" (Chandler, 1977, p. 138). The 
Chandler (1973b) and Chandler et al. (1974) studies men-
tioned above are a good example of such research. Children 
are asked to understand the affect of the central character 
of the story and the reason for such affect. Secondly, the 
child must be able to decenter from this perspective and 
take on the perspective of a bystander who does not know 
what is upsetting the central character. These studies 
focus on an empathic process because of the interpersonal 
nature of the stimuli. A child who does accomplish the 
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affective understanding and manipulation of perspectives is 
considered to be exhibiting an empathic response. 
Another study fitting in this area was completed by 
Staub (1971). He examined role-playing and its relation-
ship to helping those in a distressful situation. It was 
postulated that if helping behavior is motivated by empathy, 
children who role play helper and victim roles will improve 
their perspective-taking skill and help or share more with 
a distressed child. The improvement in role-taking ability 
produced by role-playing would improve empathic skills and 
thereby increase helping behavior. Staub found that girls 
who role played prosocial behaviorhelped more in a distress 
situation than controls who role played such roles as shop-
keeper and policeman. Boys in the prosocial role-playing 
group shared more than control subjects. 
Chaplin and Keller (1974) investigated egocentrism 
and peer interaction with a group of grade school children. 
Third grade children who were rated as poor social inter-
acters exhibited less ability to decenter in interpersonal 
situations than children who were rated as good social in-
teracters. Here, the inability to take another's perspec- / ,j 
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tive (to be emphatic) was shown to be related to poor per- \l 
sonal relationships. The more egocentric the child was the 
more he or she was perceived to interact poorly with others. 
This is important to psychopathy research because the psy-
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chopath has also been postulated to be egocentric and poor 
in interpersonal relations. 
The role-taking or perspective-taking approach to 
empathy, examined above, appears to be applicable to study-
ing psychopathy, especially since psychopaths have been 
postulated to lack role-taking skills (Gough, 1948) and ex-
hibit extreme egocentrism (Cleckley, 1976). A Piagetian 
role-taking approach which conceptualizes social cognitive 
development along a perspective-taking/egocentrism contin-
uum, would appear to work best in studying the psychopathic 
empathy deficit. In support of this expectation, Chandler 
(1973b) and Chandler et al. (1974) found a general group of 
delinquents to exhibit poorer perspective-taking skills 
than a normal control group. Jurkovic and Prentice (1977) 
also found psychopathic and neurotic delinquents, as mea-
sured by the Behavior Problem Checklist, to do poorly on a 
cognitive role-taking task when compared with a control 
group. 
Although the above studies have shown control 
groups to exhibit better perspective-taking skills and less 
egocentrism than delinquency groups, there has been no ob-
served differences between neurotic and psychopathic delin-
quents in perspective-taking skills. Theoretically and in 
clinical observation, the neurotic has been described as 
more socially sensitive and more advanced in moral reason-
ing. The observed advanced cognitive development of the 
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neurotic delinquent suggests that the neurotic delinquent 
should exhibit better role-taking skills or tale-taking em-
pathy than the psychopathic delinquent. In this study, it 
was hypothesized that psychopathic delinquents exhibit sig-
nificantly less cognitive empathy skills than neurotic de-
linquents and a comparison group of delinquents. 
Cognitive empathy measurements that are concerned 
purely with the accurate judgment or labeling of affect in 
others may not be the best method for studying empathy in 
psychopathy. Chandler and Greenspan (1972) suggested that 
such an approach in the measurement of empathy may confound 
empathy with projection or stereotyping. That is, subjects 
can make accurate judgments not only by truly understanding 
the actor's perspective but by project~ng their own feelings 
onto the actor's situation or by knowing the general 
stereotypic response to the situation presented. The psy-
chopath, then, could make accurate judgments and be con-
sidered empathic just by projecting or giving stereotypic 
responses and never really understand the actor's experi-
ence. In partial support of this observation, Savitsky and 
Czyzewski (1978) found no difference in emotional labeling 
ability between delinquents and nondelinquents when IQ was 
controlled. An emotional labeling measurement of cognitive 
empathy would probably demonstrate no significant differ-
ences between psychopaths and nonpsychopaths because of the 
methodological confounding. 
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Another measure of empathy which can be considered 
cognitive comes from the area of attributional research. 
Jones and Nesbitt (1971) suggested that actors and observ-
ers of a social interaction have different situational and 
organismic information available to them, and process this 
information differently. When asked to make ratings of 
responsibility for the situation, actors have been found to 
emphasize the environmental variables while observers have 
emphasized the actor's dispositional attributes as respon-
sible for the situation. Empathy, according to this theory, 
is operationalized as the observer attributing responsibil-
ity as the actor would (Regen & Totten, 1975). The empathy 
process occurs to the degree that the observer makes situ-
ational attributions. This definition makes no reference 
to affect or matching emotions. What is required is that 
the observer be able to understand or take on the actor's 
point of view and make attributions as the actor would. 
However, some emotional sharing may be occurring (Galper, 
1976) • 
Several studies have supported this definition of 
empathy. Galper (1976) read a distressing story about a 
man saving a baby in a fire to subjects who were told 
either to imagine themselves as the actor (empathy) or to 
just picture the events clearly. Following the story, sub-
jects made both verbal and written causal attributions 
about the actor. Subjects. in the empathy condition gave 
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situational factors more emphasis both verbally and in their 
ratings. Galper concluded that "empathy may be inferred 
from the attributions, by an observer, of environmental or 
situational causes for the behavior of an actor" (p. 334). 
Brehm and Aderman (1977) investigated either empathy 
inducing (imagine-self) or empathy inhibiting (listen-to-him) 
instructions. Subjects listened to a taped conversation 
between two students named Bruce and Torn which had either a 
positive (Bruce helped Torn) or a negative ending (Bruce did 
not help Torn). Subjects in the empathy-negative outcome 
condition rated the victim actor (Torn) more favorably than 
in the nonernpathy condition. Brehm and Aderman suggested 
that these less positive results follow the empathy ex-
planation, but cautioned that it is possible some other 
phenomena motivated this behavior (e.g., sympathy). 
Aderman, Archer, and Harris (1975) investigated the 
connection between emotional empathy and attribution of re-
sponsibility ratings. In the first experiment, subjects 
were given the Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) empathy scale 
and a series of short stories developed by Sulzer and 
Burglass (1968) were used to measure attribution ratings. 
A small but significant correlation between actor's respon-
sibility ratings and a subscale of the empathy question-
naire was observed. Aderman et al. explained this result 
by suggesting that high empathy scorers may have "vicari-
ously experienced the victims' suffering" (p. 158) in the 
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short stories and, therefore, expressed the victim's point 
of view in the responsibility ratings rather than the 
actor's. 
In a second experiment, Aderman et al. (1975) ma-
nipulated the empathy level of college students by taking 
them on a wheelchair ride through a hospital while they 
imagined one of four victim conditions. The four victim 
roles included a nonvictim role, an innocent victim role, 
a responsible victim-harmdoing role, and a responsible vic-
tim role. After completing the wheelchair ride, subjects 
completed a mood questionnaire, and rated the Sulzer and 
Burglass (1968) short stories. Results suggested "that the 
subjects who have been induced to empathize with an in-
nocent victim's plight assigned more p~rsonal responsibil-
ity to the central actors than did their 'nonvictim' 
counterparts" (Aderman et al. 1975, p. 166). 
Attribution theory offers a unique way of measuring 
empathy and suggests a way to experimentally manipulate em-
pathy by setting up different observational sets. However, 
whether empathy, sympathy, or some other variable is causing 
the observer-turned-actor attributions has not really been 
substantiated. The only evidence offered to tie these ob-
server-turned-actor attributions and empathy is a small 
correlation between an empathy questionnaire and actor's 
responsibility ratings (Aderman et al., 1975). Further in-
vestigation between empathy and attribution ratings would 
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help to verify empathy as the motivator of the observer-
turned-actor attributions. In this study, it was hypoth-
esized that actor and actor-related responsibility ratings 
are significantly negatively correlated with measures of 
emotional empathy and with cognitive empathy measures. 
External-environmental responsibility ratings were hypoth-
esized to be significantly positively correlated with mea-
sures of emotional and cognitive empathy. 
The Aderman and Berkowitz (1970} and Brehm and 
Aderman (1977} studies also suggested a way to successfully 
manipulate empathy by changing the observational set of the 
observer when listening to or viewing an interpersonal ex-
change. In this study, it was hypothesized that actor and 
actor-related variables would be rated less responsible by 
subjects listening to a negative outcome interaction with 
empathy inducing instructions than by subjects receiving 
empathy inhibiting instructions. It was further predicted 
that subjects given empathy inducing instructions, in con-
trast to those given empathy inhibiting instructions, would 
rate external-environmental variables more responsible for 
the actor's distress than the actor himself. 
The use of a population which has been hypothesized 
as deficient in empathy skills and role-taking skills (psy-
chopaths) might also add to the investigation of empathy 
and attribution. Because of their hypothesized deficit in 
empathy and role-taking skills, psychopathic delinquents 
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should not respond to empathy inducing instructions with 
lower actor responsibility ratings. Instead, psychopaths 
should be characterized by high actor ratings and low ex-
ternal-environmental ratings. The neurotic delinquent, on 
the other hand, should respond more t0empathy inducing and 
empathy inhibiting instructions because of their greater 
emotional responsivity and cognitive development. In this 
study, it was hypothesized the neurotic delinquents rate 
the actor significantly less responsible than psychopathic 
delinquents under empathy inducing instructions. It was 
further hypothesized that neurotic delinquents would rate 
external-environmental variables more responsible than psy-
chopathic delinquents under empathy inducing instructions. 
Cognitive/Affective approach. The third approach 
to empathy research contends that both a social comprehen-
sion and an emotional response are important components of 
an empathic response. Although Chandler (1977) has argued 
that to "decompose empathic responses into separable affec-
tive and cognitive components seem[s] mistakenly analytic 
and unnecessarily piecemeal" (p. 127), Iannotti (Note 6) 
has suggested that empathy defined as both emotional re-
sponsivity and role-taking or perspective-taking skills 
offers the greatest advantage to understanding empathy and 
how it is related to prosocial behavior. Adding weight to 
Iannotti's analysis is a recent article by Zajonc (1980). 
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He reviewed evidence which suggested that affective and 
cognitive components of human responsivity are separate 
functions and need to be examined as separate components. 
The investigator of the component approach to em-
pathy is concerned with the role-taking or cognitive 
ability of the observer as well as what the observer feels 
and how that relates to the actor's feelings (Feshbach, 
1978; Rotenberg, 1974; Iannotti, Notes 5, 6). Feshbach 
(1978) argued that empathy defined entirely as a cognitive 
function loses its conceptual usefulness and could be re-
placed by many other terms. The argument continued that 
empathy is different, as a concept, because of its affec-
tive dimension. One can understand a situation but not be 
moved emotionally. A person can also be moved emotionally 
but not understand what has happened. It is the combina-
tion of both cognitive and affective experience that are 
necessary for an empathic response. 
A good example of empathy research using the com-
ponent model was reported by Feshbach and Roe (1968). 
Using the same procedure reviewed above (Feshbach, 1978), a 
measure of the affective component of empathy was defined 
in terms of emotional matching. The cognitive component 
was assessed by inquiring whether children could label the 
appropriate affect depicted on slides showing children in 
various situations. It was reported that all of the sub-
jects would understand or properly judge the action shown 
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in the slides but, not all of them exhibited a matching af-
fective response. Moreover, the affective responses sig-
nificantly varied according to the sex and similarity of 
the child in the slide to the observer. Feshbach (1978) 
concluded that just understanding the pictures does not ac-
count for the systematic variability observed in the match-
ing procedure. Rather, both affect and social comprehen-
sion must be taken into account. 
Although Feshbach (1978) demonstrated the inde-
pendence of the cognitive and affective components of an 
empathic response, the two components are also closely in-
terrelated. She reported an unpublished study by Kuchen-
becker, Feshbach, and Pletcher which examined the affec-
tive and cognitive aspects of empathy for children across 
several age groups. Both social comprehension scores and 
emotional empathy scores were reported to improve as the 
child became older. Feshbach concluded that the similar de-
velopmental progression of the cognitive and affective com-
ponents of empathy suggests that the two components are 
also significantly interrelated. In the present study, it 
was hypothesized that the affective and cognitive components 
of empathy would be significantly positively correlated so 
that a subject scoring high on the cognitive empathy mea-
sure would also score high on the emotional empathy measure. 
The measurement of both cognitive and affective 
components of the empathic process appears to be especially 
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important in studying psychopathy given the above research 
and the descriptions of psychopathy. However, there are 
no published studies which directly examine both cognitive 
and affective components of empathy for psychopathy. 
One study which does add partial support to the im-
portance of measuring both affective and cognitive com-
ponents of empathy for psychopaths was completed by Roten-
berg (1974). Although Rotenberg did not examine psychop-
athy directly, he used a general delinquent sample which 
may have included a group of psychopaths. In this study, 
cognitive role-taking was measured in a guessing game in 
which subjects guessed how their partners might actually 
respond. The affective component was measured by the 
strength of shocks given to a confederate using a teacher/ 
pupil paradigm. It was reasoned that a person with high 
emotional empathy would be less aggressive and give weaker 
shocks to the confederate. No significant correlation be-
tween the two components was found. Also no significant 
difference between the delinquent and nondelinquent group 
on cognitive role-taking was reported. However, a signif-
icant difference between the delinquent and nondelinquent 
groups was reported for the affective measure. The de-
linquent group issued stronger shocks than the nonde-
linquent group and was, therefore, considered to be less 
emotionally responsive. 
This study shows again that an affective measure 
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of empathy is important in studying antisocial samples. 
The role-taking results were not as promising and contra-
diet the results of Jurkovic and Prentice (1977) who also 
used a cognitive role-taking task. One of the reasons for 
the discrepancy may be that Rotenberg's (1974) sample was 
made up of all types of delinquency. If the study had 
considered subtypes of delinquency perhaps the measures of 
both cognitive and affective ability would have shown 
lower scores for psychopathic delinquents than the other 
types. 
Empathy and Helping Behavior 
Considerable research has been performed to examine 
the relationship of empathy and prosocial behavior (Ader-
man, 1972; Aderman & Berkowitz, 1970; Berke, 1971, 1973; 
Eisenberg-Berg & Mussen, 1978; Feshbach & Feshbach, 1969; 
Hoffman, 1976; Iannotti, 1978; Karylowski, 1977; Krebs, 
1975; Kurdek, 1978; Midlarsky & Bryan, 1972; Moore, Under-
wood, & Rosenhan, 1973; Rushton, 1976; Rushton & Wiener, 
1975; Iannotti, Notes 6, 7). Most of the research rela-
V ting empathy and altruism has suggested that empathy is a J 
motivator for altruism. Although other motivators for al-
truism have been posited, Iannotti (Note 6) argued that 
empathy can be considered "the only motivator for true 
altruism--altruism having no immediate or anticipated ex-
ternal reinforcer" (p. 3). Hoffman (1975, 1976) suggested 
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that both social perspective-taking or role-taking ability 
and emotional responsiveness are important to understanding 
empathy and its role as a motivator of helping behavior. 
Hoffman {1975) observed that when we see someone in emo-
tional distress we also have an emotional reaction. The 
observed distress reaction is an empathic reaction to an-
other's distress. Once observers feel the emotional dis-
tress they can either react to it or ignore it. If the ob-
servers react, they either react as if the emotion were 
their own or react with the realization that the emotion 
is a consequence of the other's distress. This is where it 
is important for observers to be able to decenter from their 
own perspective and be able to place themselves into an-
other's perspective. The more egocentric a person is the 
less decentering ability that person exhibits. Once ob-
servers realize the distress belongs to another person they 
can reduce the feeling of distress by helping to reduce the 
other's plight. However, the above theoretical explanation 
of the relationship between altruism and empathy requires 
both cognitive and emotional components of empathy. Not 
all of the research connecting empathy and altruism uses 
such a definition of empathy. 
Affective empathy and helping behavior. Consider-
able evidence is available suggesting that people observing 
another'.s distress typically have an affective reaction 
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which can be measured physiologically (House & Milligan, 
1976; Stotland, 1969) and this is usually followed by an 
attempt to help (Geer & Jarmecky, 1973; Stotland, 1969). 
Krebs (1975) studied the psychophysiological responses of 
60 males as they observed a person playing roulette. Each 
subject was either led to believe they were similar or 
dissimilar to the player and that the player either experi-
enced pleasure, pain, or was just performing a cognitive 
and motor task while playing roulette. The subjects in the 
similar pleasure or pain situation exhibited stronger psy-
chophysiological reactions and, when given a chance to help, 
helped a significantly greater amount of the time than sub-
jects in other groups. Krebs concluded that subjects who 
reacted most empathically behaved most-altruistically. 
Iannotti (Note 6) reported a study exploring em-
pathy and altruism. Although the study examined many dif-
ferent definitions of empathy, the emotional matching mea-
sure of empathy did not relate significantly to sharing. 
Feshbach (1978) also reported an absence of significant 
correlations between emotional matching empathy and a mea-
sure of generosity. 
Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen (1978) examined the rela-
tionship between empathy, moral reasoning, and helping. Male 
subjects who helped (volunteered to assist the experimenter) 
scored significantly higher on the Mehrabian and Epstein 
(1972) emotional empathy measure. This relationship did not 
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hold for females. Empathy scores were also significantly 
correlated with a measure of prosocial moral judgment for 
both sexes. 
Aderman and Berkowitz (1970) studied emotional em-
pathy and altruism using a mood adjective checklist as a 
measure of emotional responsiveness. Subjects were asked 
to listen to a conversation between two people, a person in 
need of help and a potential helper, with instructions to 
imagine themselves as the helper or the person in need of 
help. The helper either did not help or helped and was 
thanked or not thanked. After listening to the taped con-
versation, subjects were asked to fill out a mood checklist 
and to help the experimenter. Results suggested that 
pleasurable empathic experiences had mediated the 
helping behavior of subjects who attended to the 
thanked helper, while unpleasant empathic reactions 
had more strongly motivated the helping behavior of 
subjects who observed the unaided person in need. 
(Aderman & Berkowitz, 1970, p. 141) 
The Aderman and Berkowitz study suggests that people 
do respond emotionally to a distress situation and that the 
affect produced does increase helping behavior. On the 
basis of these findings, it was hypothesized, for the pres-
ent study, that subjects given empathy inducing instruc-
tions help significantly more than those given empathy in-
hibiting instructions. 
It may also be noted that the Aderman and Berko-
witz empathy manipulation required considerable role-taking 
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ability. In order to imagine oneself as a helper or 
helpee, one must be able to decenter or role-play properly, 
and this ability is never addressed in the study. Sub-
jects who are more egocentric would be expected to show 
little empathy regardless of the observational set instruc-
tions. Thus, for the present research, psychopaths were 
hypothesized to exhibit significantly less helping behavior 
under empathy inducing instructions than neurotic delinquents 
given the same instructions. 
The studies mentioned above suggest that empathy 
defined as an affective reaction is related to helping 
behavior. However, not all of the procedures used to 
measure affective empathy were successful. The emotional 
! .. / 
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matching measure of empathy did not relate to altruism at 
all. This may have been due to the possibility that the 
emotional matching procedure is not actually measuring em-
pathy but is measuring experimenter demand. Both the 
physiological and self-report measures have been success-
fully related to helping behavior and further study into 
their relationship to helping behavior would be beneficial. 
Labeling empathy and helping. Very little research 
has been reported concerning the relationship between help-
ing behavior and labeling definition of empathy. Iannotti 
(Note 6) reported there was no significant relationshp be-
tween a social understanding measure of empathy and sharing 
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behavior. The social understanding measure consisted of 
eight photographs wherein "the emotional response of the 
character was congruent with the situation, e.g., a happy 
child at a birthday party" (Iannotti, 1975, p. 3). Social 
understanding was scored when the subject correctly iden-
tified the emotion portrayed in the picture. More re-
search exploring the relationship between a labeling or a 
social comprehension definition of empathy and helping be-
havior needs to be completed. 
Role-taking and helping behavior. The relationship 
between empathy as role-taking and helping behavior has 
been explored to a greater extent (Emler & Rushton, 1974; 
Kurdek, 1978; Rubin & Schneider, 1973; Rushton & Wiener, 
1975; Staub, 1971; Iannotti, Note 7). Staub (1971) ex-
amined the relationship between role-playing, induction, 
role-playing with induction, and altruism (sharing and 
helping behavior). He reported that girls, after playing 
the roles of both helpers and victims, helped another child 
significantly more. Boys role playing both helpers and 
victims shared significantly more than control subjects. 
Staub also reported that these findings continued 5 to 7 
days after the training sessions. Rubin and Schneider 
(1973) found scores on a measure of communicative ego-
centrism correlated positively with measures of altruism. 
Low egocentrism scorers displayed more donating and help-
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ing behavior. Emler and Rushton (1974) and Rushton and 
Wiener {1975), however, found no relationship between role-
taking ability, egocentrism, and generosity behavior. 
Iannotti {Note 7) studied role-taking, role-taking train-
ing, empathy, and altruism. A significant positive corre-
lation between role-taking and altruism was reported for 
7-year-old subjects but not for 10-year-old subjects which 
suggests the relationship between role-taking and altruism 
may change with age. 
Kurdek {1978), in a review of the perspective-taking 
literature concerned with moral behavior, concluded that 
there was no consistent significant relationship between 
measures of altruism and perspective-taking measures. One 
of the possible reasons for the lack of support is the fact 
that investigators used various different measures of role-
taking ability, Kurdek suggests that these different mea-
sures actually deal with quite different aspects of per-
spective-taking {perceptual, cognitive, and affective as-
pects of perspective-taking) and require the subject to 
solve the role-taking task in different ways (i.e., suc-
cessive decentering, simultaneous decentering, or referen-
tial communication) • Not all of these different types of 
perspective-taking or different decentering processes may 
be equally related to helping behavior. 
Also the many different situations used to elicit 
helping behavior may be responsible for the inconsistent 
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relationship between altruism and perspective-taking skills. 
For example, Emler and Rushton (1973), Rushton and Wiener 
(1975), and Iannotti (Note 7) used experimental situations 
in which the subject could help in a very indirect manner 
by sharing or being generous to an absent person. Such a 
helping situation may not elicit any affective response in 
the subject because the distress is so far removed. This 
would disrupt the altruistic process as outlined by Hoffman 
(1975). In an immediate distress situation, where the sub-
ject must perform some direct helping behavior, this emo-
tional component is more likely to be activated and the 
helping occur. For example, Green (1975) and Rubin and 
Schneider (1973) both found a positive correlation between 
perspective-taking and helping behavior in an interpersonal 
distress situation. 
Cognitive/affective empathy and helping. Emotional ~ 
responsiveness appears to be related to altruism and appears 
to be a motivator of altruistic behavior. However, the af-
fective response is facilitated or inhibited by cognitive 
factors. Hoffman (1975) posited three cognitive develop-
mental steps a person must attain before an empathic reac-
tion can lead to an act of altruism. These steps include 
the following abilities: (a) to distinguish self from 
others; (b) "to acquire a sense of others not only as 
physical entities but also as sources of feelings and 
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thoughts in their own right, that is as persons who have 
inner states that, at times, differ from his own, as well 
as perspective based on their own needs and interpretation 
of events" (p. 616); (c) to conceive "of himself and others 
as continuous persons each with his own history and iden-
tity" (p. 616). These three steps have all been hypoth-
esized to make up role-taking ability. 
The relationship between altruism and empathy de-
fined by both cognitive and affective components has re-
ceived very little empirical attention. Iannotti (1978) 
studied role-taking ability, role-taking training, al-
truism, aggression, and empathy. It was hypothesized that 
role-taking training would increase role-taking ability as 
measured by the Flavell et al. (1968) nickel-dime game. 
The increase in role-taking ability would increase empathy 
since empathy requires both an affective and cognitive com-
ponent and, as empathy increased, altruism would increase. 
However, no significant relationship was found between em-
pathy and role-taking ability which may suggest either em-
pathy cannot be influenced by social comprehension training 
or the measure of empathy was not very sensitive. The mea-
sure of empathy used by Iannotti consisted of 16 pictures 
and coinciding stories depicting four different emotions. 
In eight of the pictures the emotion portrayed by the char-
acter was incongruent with the situation. Subjects were 
asked to indicate how the character felt and how they felt 
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by pointing to one of eight faces which were labeled as 
very happy, sad, angry, or afraid or just happy, sad, angry, 
and afraid. Feshbach (1978) observed that "the incongruous 
situation is an artificial one, rarely occurring in the 
life history of the child • and would appear to be more 
cognitively disruptive than empathy evoking" (pp. 21-22) • 
This suggests that Iannotti's (1978) empathy measure is not 
really tapping empathy but is perhaps better "for investi-
gating the resolution of incongruent stimuli and other cog-
nitive dilemmas" (Feshbach, 1978, p. 22). Such a measure 
would not be expected to relate significantly with any 
measure of altruism. 
OVerall, the relationship between empathy and al-
truism is very unclear. Studies investigating the rela-
tionship between empathy and altruism have generally demon-
strated a significant positive relationship between emo-
tional empathy and helping behavior. Research connecting 
cognitive definitions of empathy with altruism have re-
ported conflicting results. It was suggested that these 
conflicting results may have occurred because the many cog-
nitive measures of empathy actually examine different cog-
nitive skills and not all of these skills may be equally 
related to helping behavior. Finally, very few studies 
have investigated the relationship between both cognitive 
and affective measures of empathy with altruism. However, 
it is the cognitive/affective approach which Hoffman (1975) 
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has postulated to be the most important to understanding 
helping behavior. In this study, it was hypothesized that 
a measure of cognitive empathy and a measure of helping 
are significantly positively correlated, so a person scor-
ing high on the cognitive empathy measure also demonstrates 
more helping behavior. As noted previously, the affective 
empathy measure and the helping measure were hypothesized 
to be significantly positively correlated so that a sub-
ject exhibiting high emotional empathy also helps more. 
The use of a subject population (psychopaths) which 
has been described as lacking emotional empathy skills and 
has exhibited a deficit in cognitive role-taking skills 
may also help clarify the relationship between empathy and 
helping. An empathy deficient population would help less 
than other groups in a distress situation. In terms of 
Hoffman's (1975) model, the psychopath would first exhibit 
difficulty in responding emotionally to another's plight. 
If an emotional response were possible, the psychopath 
would next exhibit extreme difficulty in decentering and 
knowing that this affect was in response to another's dis-
tress. With this in mind, it was hypothesized that psycho-
paths exhibit significantly less helping behavior than 
neurotic delinquents or a comparison group of juvenile of-
fenders. 
70 
Psychopathy and Helping Behavior 
Hoffman's (1975} explanation of the relationship be-
tween empathy and helping behavior, mentioned earlier, of-
fers a good theoretical base for studying empathy and psy-
chopathy. Both cognitive (decentering} and affective com-
ponents of empathy were postulated to be connected with a 
helping act. As suggested, both components are important 
to studying empathy in psychopaths. Berkowitz (1970} has 
also suggested that extreme self-interest (egocentrism} 
hampers helping. Since it is hypothesized that psycho-
paths are deficient in empathy and egocentric, their help-
ing behavior would also be expected to be less than that 
of neurotics who are more emotionally responsive. Unfor-
tunately, I was unable to find any studies which directly 
addressed this issue. 
Several studies concerned with the helping behavior 
of other clinical populations and personality groupings may 
add some support to the above hypothesis concerning helping 
behavior and psychopathy. First, Tolor, Kelly, and Stebbins 
(1976} investigated the helping behavior of college stu-
dents and psychiatric patients. No significant difference 
was found between the groups on an altruism scale. The 
psychiatric patients, though, more often offered assistance 
and actually gave assistance to a disabled confederate than 
college students. This suggests that a group characterized 
by emotional disturbance or emotional conflicts can exhibit 
71 
empathy and helping behavior. Since neurotic delinquents 
are also characterized by an emotional conflict, it can be 
suggested that neurotic delinquents may exhibit helping 
behavior similar to the helping behavior demonstrated by 
the psychiatric patient group. However, an inference about 
psychopaths and helping behavior can not be made from this 
study. 
Wagner, Manning, and Wheeler (1971) examined dif-
ferences in helping behavior between high and low scorers 
on an Insolence scale (Kipnis, 1968). High scorers on this 
scale were "characterized as immature, materialistic, re-
sistant to social norms, and exploitive of peers" (Wagner 
et al. 1971, p. 37). They also reported high-insolence 
scorers helped less than low scorers as the cost of the 
help to the helper increased. The high-insolence group ex-
hibited some characteristics similar to those of psycho-
paths. If these groups are similar, then the psychopath 
can also be expected to exhibit lower levels of helping 
behavior. 
Weiner and Pisano (1977) investigated the rela-
tionship between donating behavior and the mean level of 
electric shocks administered to an experimenter/confederate. 
Aggressive measures and donating behavior were signifi-
cantly negatively correlated so that extreme aggressors 
donated less than low aggressors. This suggests that an 
aggressive, acting-out population would probably exhibit 
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less altruistic behavior. Since low-empathy scorers on the 
Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) scale also shocked pupils more 
than high-empathy scorers, it can be further suggested that 
a low-empathy, acting-out population (psychopaths) would be 
the least altruistic. This relationship needs further ex-
ploration. 
Statement of the Problem 
and Hypotheses 
The present study investigated empathy and helping 
behavior in psychopathic, neurotic, and a general compari-
son group of delinquents. Empathy measures included two 
self-report questionnaires of affective empathy (Mehrabian 
and Epstein emotional empathy scale and Schalling's De-
tachment scale) and a cognitive empathy measure (Chandler's 
perspective-taking measure). Empathy was also manipulated 
in an experimental situation with subjects listening to a 
taped distress situation after receiving either empathy in-
ducing or empathy inhibiting observational instructions. 
Attribution of responsibility ratings for the taped situa-
tion and helping measures were obtained following the em-
pathy manipulation. Subjects rated to what extent the 
actor of the tape (Tom), an actor related variable (Tom's 
manner of speech) , and external-environmental variables 
(luck, detention center staff, and the potential helper, 
Bob) were responsible for the distress situation. Help-
ing behavior was operationally defined as the total number 
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of Neuroticism subscales of the Eysenck Personality In-
ventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968) scored for the experi-
menter in a 10 minute period. A quality of help measure 
was obtained by determining the total number of accurately 
scored Neuroticism subscales for the 10 minute period. 
In a review of literature on empathy, it was re-
ported that empathy has been conceptualized in three gen-
eral ways: (a) the affective hypothesis; (b) the cog-
nitive hypothesis; and (c) the cognitive/affective hypoth-
esis. In line with Feshbach's (1978) suggestion that an 
adeuqate understanding of empathy must take into account 
both cognitive and affective components, empathy was con-
ceptualized as being comprised of both components in this 
study. Feshbach also suggested that the cognitive and af-
fective components of empathy follow a similar developmental 
pattern and are closely interrelated. Because of the in-
terrelatedness of the cognitive and affective components 
of empathy, the following is hypothesized. 
Hypothesis 1. The measures of affective empathy 
and cognitive empathy are signif-
icantly positively correlated. 
In the review of the psychopathy literature, it 
was postulated that the psychopath exhibits a lack of em-
pathy. This deficit in empathy was reported in research 
which examined the emotional responsivity of the psycho-
path (Hare, 1978) and the cognitive perspective-taking 
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skills of the psychopathic delinquent (Jurkovic & Prentice, 
1977). Since the psychopath has exhibited deficits in both 
cognitive and affective measures of empathy, the cognitive/ 
affective definition of empathy was considered the best 
suited for studying psychopathic delinquency. The follow-
ing hypotheses are generated concerning psychopathic de-
linquency and the cognitive/affective measurement of em-
pathy. 
Hypothesis 2. Psychopathic delinquents exhibit (a) 
significantly less emotional empathy 
than neurotic delinquents and (b) 
significantly less emotional empathy 
than a comparison group of delin-
quents. 
Hypothesis 3. Psychopathic delinquents exhibit (a) 
significantly less cognitive empathy 
than neurotic delinquents and (b) 
significantly less cognitive empathy 
than a comparison group of juvenile 
offenders. 
Hoffman (1975) suggested empathy is a motivator of 
helping behavior. According to Hoffman (1976), the ob-
server of a distress situation must first experience an emo-
tional response to the situation and, second, be able to 
cognitively determine that the emotional response is caused 
by the situation and not some personal distress before help-
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ing behavior can take place. Both cognitive skills and 
affective aspects of empathy are important in bringing 
about a helping response. In this study, both cognitive 
and affective components of empathy were postulated to be 
motivators of helping behavior. The following relation-
ship between helping behavior and the cognitive/affective 
measures of empathy are hypothesized. 
Hypothesis 4. The measure of cognitive empathy 
and helping behavior are signifi-
cantly positively correlated. 
Hypothesis 5. The measures of emotional empathy 
and helping behavior are signif-
icantly positively correlated. 
Several studies conducted by Aderman and his col-
leagues (Aderman & Berkowitz, 1970; Aderman et al. 1975; 
Brehm & Aderman, 1977) suggest that empathy can be manipu-
lated by using different observational instructions for 
subjects observing a distressful situation. Aderman and 
Berkowitz (1970) successfully demonstrated a connection 
between empathy and helping behavior by varying empathy 
through observational set manipulation. Subjects who 
listened to a distress situation with a negative outcome 
and were given empathy inducing instructions were reported 
to have helped the experimenter more than subjects who 
listened to the distress situation under empathy inhibit-
ing instructions. 
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The method for empathy maniuplation utilized by 
Aderman and his colleagues was suggested to require a great 
deal of role-taking ability as well as some degree of emo-
tional responsiveness. Considering the psychopath's ob-
served deficit in role-taking-ability (Jurkovic & Prentice, 
1977) and postulated deficit in emotional empathy (McCord 
& McCord, 1956), it was reasoned that the psychopath might 
react differently to an empathy manipulation task than sub-
jects in previously reported studies. Also, neurotic de-
linquents have been associated with greater degrees of emo-
tional responsivity and a more advanced social cognitive 
development than psychopathic delinquents (Hare & Cox, 
1978a; Quay & Peterson, Note 1). With this in mind, it was 
reasoned that the neurotic delinquent may respond more ap-
propriately to an empathy manipulation than the psycho-
pathic delinquent and help more under an empathy inducing 
observational set. 
The following hypotheses are generated concerning 
the experimental manipulation of empathy, delinquency sub-
groups, and helping behavior. 
Hypothesis 6. Subjects given empathy inducing in-
structions help significantly more 
than those given empathy inhibiting 
instructions. 
Hypothesis 7. Psychopaths exhibit (a) signifi-
cantly less helping behavior than 
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neurotic delinquents and {b) signif-
icantly less helping behavior than a 
comparison group of delinquents. 
Hypothesis 8. Psychopaths given empathy inducing 
instructions exhibit significantly 
less helping behavior than neurotic 
delinquents given the same instruc-
tions. 
Another measure of empathy which has surfaced re-
cently, comes from attribution theory. Regen and Totten 
(1975) and Galper {1976) suggested that empathy could be 
defined as an observer making actor like attributions. An 
empathic observer, then, would be expected to rate environ-
mental or external conditions more responsible for the ob-
served situation than the actor's disposition. Studies 
completed by Aderman et al. {1975), Galper {1976), and 
Brehm and Aderman {1977) have supported this hypothesis. 
However, whether empathy, intelligence, or some other factor 
causes the observer-turned-actor attributions has not been 
clarified. If observer-turned-actor attributions are re-
lated to empathy, then these attributions should be related 
to other empathy measures. 
The following hypotheses concern the relationship 
between cognitive/affective measures of empathy and the at-
tribution measure of empathy. 
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Hypothesis 9. The emotional empathy question-
naire and responsibility ratings 
concerning actor variables such as 
Tom and Tom's manner of speech are 
significantly negatively correlated. 
Hypothesis 10. The emotional empathy question-
naire and responsibility ratings 
concerning the external environ-
ment, such as the potential helper, 
the staff, and luck are significantly 
positively correlated. 
Hypothesis 11. Cognitive empathy and actor re-
sponsibility ratings are signif-
icantly negatively correlated. 
Hypothesis 12. Cognitive empathy and external en-
vironment ratings are significantly 
positively correlated. 
According to the attribution theory reviewed earlier, 
observers tend to rate external-environmental factors less 
responsible and the actor variables more responsible for 
the outcome of an observed situation (Jones & Nesbitt, 
1968}. Actors, on the other hand, have been observed to 
rate external-environmental factors more responsible and 
personal variables less responsible. However, Aderman et 
al. (1975} and Brehm and Aderman (1977) have shown respon-
sibility ratings to be sensitive to the acting-out of 
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different roles and changes in observational sets. Under 
an empathy inducing observational set, observers were found 
to rate external-environmental factors more responsible and 
the distressed actor as less responsible for the distress 
situation. With this in mind, the following hypotheses con-
cerning the relationship between an empathy manipulation and 
attribution ratings are made. 
Hypothesis 13. Subjects given empathy inducing 
instructions rate actor and actor 
related items less responsible than 
subjects given empathy inhibiting 
instructions. 
Hypothesis 14. Subjects given empathy inducing 
instructions rate external environ-
ment items such as the potential 
helper (Bob), staff, and luck more 
responsible than subjects given em-
pathy inhibiting instructions. 
Delinquency subgroups were also considered important 
to attribution of responsibility ratings under different 
observational sets. Since psychopathic delinquents demon-
strated poor role-taking ability and have been observed to 
lack empathic ability, it was reasoned that the psycho-
pathic delinquent would continue to make observer-like at-
tributions even under empathy inducing instructions. Since 
neurotic delinquents were observed to be more socially sen-
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sitive and responsive, it was reasoned that this offender 
group would respond more to the empathy manipulation and 
make more actor-like attributions under empathy inducing 
instructions. 
The following hypotheses are related to the experi-
mental manipulation of empathy, attribution of responsi-
bility ratings, and the delinquency subgroups. 
Hypothesis 15. Under empathy inducing instruc-
tions, neurotic delinquents rate 
the actor less responsible than 
psychopathic delinquents. 
Hypothesis 16. Under empathy inducing instructions, 
the neurotic delinquent rates the 
staff, luck, and potential helper 
more responsible than the psycho-
pathic delinquent. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects for this study were 52 male adolescents 
obtained from two youth homes in the Chicago metropolitan 
area. The youth homes can best be described as juvenile 
detention centers where juvenile offenders are held until 
released or transferred by the juvenile court. The youth 
homes were selected on the basis of their similarity in 
subject population, admissions criteria, and treatment 
approach. Only males between the ages·of 13 to 18 were 
included in this study. 
Originally, 64 boys were asked to take part in the 
study. Of those asked, 9 preferred not to participate in 
the study and were dropped from the sample without com-
pleting any of the research procedures. Three subjects who 
were presented the research procedures were later excluded 
because they did not complete all of the research procedures. 
Sample data. The sample of 52 youths had an average 
of 2.27 incarcerations with a standard deviation of 1.33. 
Subjects had been charged with a variety of offenses. Their 
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current charges were categorized as: (a) violence to 
others ( 21.2%) , (b) violence to property ( 7. 7%) , (c) 
theft (59.6%) which included burglary, auto theft, armed 
robbery without injury to others, and shoplifting, and 
(d) nonviolent crimes (11.5%) which included possession 
of drugs, disorderly conduct, and probation violations. 
The length of stay in the homes averaged 11.14 days with a 
standard deviation of 6.90. 
The age, race, socioeconomic status, and IQ of the 
sample were also monitored. Subjects' ages ranged from 
13.80 years to 17.17 years with a mean of 15.69 years and 
standard deviation of .94. The total group of offenders 
were 73.1% Caucasian, 17.2% Negro, and 9.6% Latino. Rat-
ings of socioeconomic status were obtained by ranking the 
occupation of the offender's head of household according to 
a scale developed by Coleman (1959). The greatest number 
of boys fell in the upper lower class category (32.7%). 
There were 25.0% of the sample which fell in the inde-
terminate lower class, 13.5% in the lower middle class, 
1.9% in the lower lower class, 7.7% in the indeterminate 
middle class, and 1.9% in both the middle and upper class. 
The average IQ for the sample was 91.69 with a standard 
deviation of 13.91. 
Ratings by the detention staff on the Behavior 
Problem Checklist (Quay & Peterson, Note 1) yielded a mean 
of 7.86 with a standard deviation of 5.76 for the conduct 
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problem subscale and a mean of 5.81 with a standard devia-
tion of 3.66 for the personality problem subscale. Schuck, 
Dubeck, Cymbalisty, and Green (1972) reported a similar 
conduct problem subscale mean of 6.67 with a standard devia-
tion of 5.10 and a similar personality problem subscale 
mean of 5.75 with a standard deviation of 3.44 for a sample 
of 85 male delinquents. 
Delinquency subgroup data. On the basis of the 
mean scores from the subscales of the Behavior Problem 
Checklist, the subjects were divided into three research 
subgroups which were labeled the psychopathic delinquent 
group, the neurotic delinquent group, and the contrast de-
linquent group. Psychopathic delinquency was defined as 
all subjects scoring above the mean on the conduct problem 
subscale and below the mean on the personality problem sub-
scale. Eleven of the offenders comprised this group. The 
neurotic delinquency group included all subjects scoring 
above the mean on the personality problem subscale and be-
low the mean on the conduct problem subscale. This group 
was made up of nine subjects. The contrast group con-
sisted of all offenders whose Behavior Problem Checklist 
ratings did not fit the above criteria and consisted of 32 
subjects. 
Table 1 includes the means and standard deviations 
for the conduct problem and personality problem subscales, 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Conduct Problem Scale, the Personality Problem Scale, 
IQ Scores, Age, and Number of Admittances 
Variables 
Delinquency Conduct Personality Age Admit-
Group Problem Problem IQ (Months) tances SES 
Psychopath M 10.91 3.73 90.27 185.64 2.00 2.43 
SD 2.30 1.56 16.81 15.29 1.10 .53 
(X) 
Neurotic M 2.56 9.22 99.11 185.89 2.56 3.38 ~ 
SD 2.30 2.04 8.71 7.47 1. 94 .74 
Contrast M 8.31 5.56 90.09 189.78 2.28 3.31 
SD 6.31 3.90 13.73 10.62 1. 22 1. 34 
Total M 7.86 5.80 91.69 188.23 2.67 3.18 
SD 5.76 3.66 13.91 11.27 1.33 1.14 
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as well as those for the variables of age, intelligence, 
socioeconomic status (SES), and the number of admittances 
to a detention facility. The data are presented according 
to the three delinquency subgroups of psychopathy, neu-
roticism, and a contrast offender group. 
Differences between the three delinquency groups in 
age, intelligence, socioeconomic status, and number of ad-
missions were checked to insure the comparability of these 
groups. There were no significant differences in verbal 
intelligence between the delinquency groups, F(2,49) = 1.58. 
Also no significant differences were evident between de-
linquency groups for age, ~(2,49) = .78, socioeconomic 
status, ~F(2,41) = 1.55, or the number of admissions, 
!(2,49) = .42. The lack of significant differences be-
tween delinquency groups on these variables indicated that 
any further group differences found in empathy levels, per-
spective-taking skills, or helping behavior are not con-
founded by these variables. 
Materials 
Behavior ratings. The Behavior Problem Checklist 
(Quay & Peterson, Note 1) is a 55-item behavior-problem 
rating scale which can be used to determine problem be-
haviors manifested in childhood and adolescence. Factor 
analytic studies of the Behavior Problem Checklist have 
identified four major factors or subscales related to 
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juvenile delinquency. The conduct problem subscale (psycho-
pathic delinquency) has been described as including "such 
behaviors as impulsiveness, distrust of authority, lying, 
stealing, physical aggression, hostile and negative de-
meanor, poor response to praise or punishment" (Borkovec, 
1970, p. 218), and "an absence of concern for others" 
(Quay, 1966, p. 101). The personality problem subscale 
(neurotic delinquency) has been described as "a dimension 
of anxiety, depression, inferiority and withdrawal" (Quay, 
1966, p. 102). The other two subscales of the Behavior 
Problem Checklist are labeled Inadequacy-Immaturity and 
Socialized Delinquency and were not used in this study. 
Although there are no standardized Behavior Prob-
lem Checklist norms for the age group utilized in this 
study, Quay and Peterson (Note 1) reported mean behavior 
ratings for a general sampled school children ranging from 
kindergarten to sixth grade. A mean conduct problem scale 
score of 2.93 with a standard deviation of 3.66 was re-
ported for a sample of 62 sixth grade males. A mean per-
sonality problem subscale score of 2.77 with a standard 
deviation of 3.13 was also reported for this group. 
In the present study, 14 of the juvenile offenders 
were rated by two different staff members to allow for a 
·measure of interrater reliability. Ratings by the differ-
ent staff members demonstrated significant interrater re-
liability coefficients of .83 for the conduct problem sub-
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scale and of .63 for the personality problem subscale. 
Affective empathy. A questionnaire measure of em-
pathy (emotional empathy) was used to determine the em-
pathic tendency of each subject. Aleksic and Savitsky 
(Note 4) revised an empathy questionnaire developed by 
Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) for use with a delinquent 
population. The questionnaire consists of 33 statements 
which are rated either true or false by the subject (Ap-
pendix A). Statements concern various interpersonal situa-
tions and possible emotional reactions which may be associ-
ated with such situations. A total empathy score is com-
puted by assigning one point for each answer matching the 
scoring key and then obtaining the algebraic sum of all 33 
responses to the questionnaire. 
A second measure of affective empathy (Detachment) 
consisted of items from the Detachment subscale of the Im-
pulsiveness-Monotony Avoidance-Detachment inventory (Schall-
ing, 1978) (Appendix A). This scale was developed to mea-
sure a "lack of closeness and warmth in interpersonal rela-
tions" (Schalling, 1978, p. 92). The inventory consists 
of 10 true-false items. A detachment score was obtained by 
assigning one point for each answer which indicates a pref-
erence for distance and lack of warmth in interpersonal 
relationships. The higher the score the more the subject 
was considered detached or less emotionally responsive 
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(emotional empathy) • Since this scale did not come to the 
researcher's attention until after the present study was 
underway, this second measure of empathy was completed by 
only 31 subjects. 
Cognitive empathy. Cognitive empathy was measured 
with a procedure developed by Chandler (1973a, 1973b) and 
Chandler et al. (1974). The empathy or perspective-taking 
measure consisted of a series of three cartoon sequences. 
Subjects were asked to describe each cartoon both from the 
main character's point-of-view and from the perspective of 
a second story character (bystander) who had access to less 
information than the main character. Verbatim recordings 
were made of each subject's responses. Points were scored 
when a subject assigned more information to the cartoon by-
stander during inquiry than was available to the bystander 
in the cartoon. Each cartoon description was rated with a 
5-point scoring system reported by Chandler (1973b). For 
the present study, the point system was inverted from the 
original Chandler system so that a high score would reflect 
a lack of egocentric intrusion and more empathic ability. 
A score of zero was assigned to those stories which did 
not take into consideration any difference in the avail-
ability of information between the cartoon's main charac-
ter and the cartoon bystander. A score of four was as-
signed to those stories which took into consideration the 
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difference of information available to the bystander and 
the main character. A sum was obtained by totalling the 
ratings from all three cartoons. The interrater reliabil-
ity computed for a sample of 21 cartoon stories which were 
scored by two independent raters, indicated a high level 
(E = .99) of interrater agreement. 
Empathy manipulation. Two cassette tapes contain-
ing either empathy inducing or empathy inhibiting instruc-
tions and a 90-sec. taped conversation were used to manipu-
late empathy. The taped conversation was fashioned after 
that reported by Aderman and Berkowitz (1970), however, 
the content was changed to make it more familiar to the 
subject population (Appendix A). On the tape, two boys 
named Tom and Bob met in a hallway of a youth home. When 
the two boys meet, Tom is working hard mopping the floors 
and Bob is on his way to do some schoolwork. Bob learns 
that Tom is behind in his work because no one would help 
and cannot go to play basketball until he is finished. 
Bob, however, does not offer to help Tom and leaves to 
finish his schoolwork. 
Attribution ratings. Each subject was asked to 
make attribution of responsibility ratings in response to 
an audio tape. Subjects rated to what extent the main 
actor (Tom), an actor related variable (Tom's manner of 
speech), and external-environmental variables (Bob, staff, 
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and luck) were responsible for the main character's predic-
ament. Each of the above were rated on a scale which ranged 
from 1 to 100% responsibility with increments of 10 being 
marked between the two endpoints. 
Helping measures. Helping behavior was operation-
alized as the number of questionnaires scored in 10 minutes 
by the subject in response to the experimenter's plea for 
help. Subjects scored the Neuroticism subscale of the 
Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968) 
which had been filled out on standard answer sheets during 
a previous research project completed by the author. A 
helping behavior total was obtained by summing the number 
of completely scored questionnaires and an accuracy of 
helping score was obtained by determining the percentage of 
correctly scored questionnaires. 
Intelligence measure. The Peabody Picture Vocabu-
lary Test (Form A) was used as a measure of verbal intel-
ligence. The test consists of 150 words with a corres-
ponding card of four pictures. Subjects are required to 
point out which picture best describes the corresponding 
word. Scoring followed the standard procedure as described 
by Dunn (1965). 
Procedure 
Juvenile offenders were assigned to a staff member 
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for behavioral observation upon admission to the detention 
center. Subjects were observed from 3 to 32 days depending 
upon their length of stay at the detention center. Staff 
members rated their assigned offender on the Behavior Prob-
lem Checklist the day of the juvenile's release from the 
home. Subjects were assigned to one of the three delin-
quency groups based on the behavior ratings. 
The experimenter talked with each juvenile during 
his stay in the detention center. Upon first meeting, the 
experimenter explained to each offender that this was a 
research project studying social observation, explained 
confidentiality, and secured consent. Each consenting sub-
ject was interviewed individually and the experimental pro-
cedure lasted about 80 minutes. 
Introduction to the first procedure was as follows: 
First, I want you to listen to a taped conversation be-
tween two boys. After the tape ends you will be asked 
to rate the boys and what happened on the tape. I want 
you to listen to this conversation in a special way. 
Directions for how you are to listen to the conversa-
tion are recorded on this tape. In order to keep me 
from influencing your ratings, I want you to listen to 
the directions through this earplug so I cannot hear 
which directions you've received. Please signal when 
the talking stops. 
Each subject listened to one of two taped observa-
tiona! instructions which were taken from the imagine-self 
(empathy inducing) and the listen-to-me {empathy inhibiting) 
instructions reported by Aderman {1972). However, Ader-
man's instructions were changed slightly to make them more 
easily understood by the subject sample utilized in this 
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study. The tapes were coded so that the investigator was 
blind to the actual directions contained on each tape. 
Subjects who received the imagine-self (empathy in-
ducing} instructions heard the following: 
In a few moments you will be listening to two boys named 
Torn and Bob, acting out a conversation which actually 
took place. While the two boys talk, please imagine 
how you would feel if you were Torn talking with Bob. 
While you are listening to Torn you are to think about 
the way you would feel while talking to Bob. Your job 
will be to think about what your reactions would be in 
Torn's place while talking with Bob. In your mind's eye, 
you are to imagine how it would feel to you to be Torn 
in this situation. 
Subjects who received the listen-to-him (empathy 
inhibiting) directions heard the following: 
In a few minutes you will be listening to two boys 
named Tom and Bob, acting out a conversation which 
actually took place. While the two boys talk, please 
listen to what Torn says very closely. You are to 
listen carefully to Tom's speech, his tone of voice, 
how fast he talks, how he is talking, hou loudly he is 
talking, whether his voice breaks, etc. You are not 
to think about how you would feel in Torn's place, or 
about how Tom is feeling. 
Once the subject signaled the end of the directions, 
the earplug was disconnected and the tape was advanced. The 
experimenter explained that the subject must first learn the 
differences between Bob and Torn's voices before listening 
to the conversation. In order to accomplish this, each 
subject listened to both Bob and Torn saying, "Testing 1 -
2 - 3, this is _____ speaking," a technique employed by 
Aderman and Berkowitz (1970}. Following this, one of the 
boys (Bob} stated, "Peter Piper picked a peck of pickled 
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peppers." Each subject was asked to identify the speaker. 
Subjects were allowed to listen to the identification seg-
ment again if they were unsure or had not identified the 
speaker properly. After speaker identification, all sub-
jects listened to the same taped interchange described 
earlier. 
Upon completion of the taped conversation the ex-
perimenter gave the subject a sheet of paper containing 
the five attribution-of-responsibility scales to complete. 
Each scale was read to the subject to facilitate comple-
tion. 
Next, the experimenter explained to the subject 
that he must leave the room in order to pick up the forms 
needed for the next part of the study •. Before leaving, the 
experimenter attempted to elicit the subject's help by 
stating: 
It will take me about 10 minutes to get the forms for 
the next part of the experiment and fill them in. While 
I am gone I was wondering if you would mind doing me a 
favor. I am behind in scoring these data sheets from 
another study and I need help to get them done. Let me 
show you how to score them so you can work on the data 
sheets, if you want to, while I am gone. 
The experimenter presented the subject with a stack 
of data sheets and demonstrated to the subject how to score 
them. After explaining, the experimenter left the room and 
returned 10 minutes later with the forms needed to complete 
the study. Two magazines were available in the room to give 
offenders who did not wish to help something else to do. 
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Upon his return, the experimenter thanked the sub-
ject, if he had helped, and introduced the revised empathy 
questionnaire for completion. Items were read aloud in 
order to facilitate completion of the questionnaire by 
poor readers. 
After the questionnaire was completed the cognitive 
empathy procedure was introduced. The experimenter ex-
plained that he wanted the subject to look at three car-
toons which are similar to comic strips in the daily news-
paper. The subject would find that each cartoon sequence 
had a theme and the experimenter was interested in what the 
subject thought was happening in the cartoon. Both the 
main character's and the bystander's thoughts and feelings 
were elicited through inquiry following the procedure out-
lined by Chandler (1973b). 
Following the cognitive empathy measure, subjects 
were presented the intelligence test, a demographic ques-
tionnaire, and the Detachment empathy scale. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Cognitive and Affective 
Measures of Empathy 
In this study, an empathic response was conceptu-
alized as being comprised of both cognitive and affective 
components. It was hypothesized (Hl) that both the cogni-
tive and emotional measures of empathy correlate signifi-
cantly positively, i.e., subjects who exhibited more affec-
tive empathy were expected to exhibit more cognitive em-
pathy. Table 2 includes the correlations between the two 
affective empathy measures (Detachment scale and emotional 
empathy scale), the cognitive empathy measure, helping 
scores, and the IQ measure. Contrary to the prediction, 
there were no significant correlations between the affec-
tive and cognitive measures of empathy. However, both of 
the self-report scales of affective empathy correlated sig-
nificantly so that a person who expressed more emotional de-
tachment in interpersonal relationships also reported less 
emotional empathy, r(31) = -.36, £<.02. 
Cognitive/Affective Empathy 
and Psychopathy 
Several authors have observed that the psychopath 
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Table 2 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Between 
Empathy, Helping, and IQ Measures 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
1. Emotional Empathy 
2. Cognitive Empathy .17 
3. Detachment a -.36** .03 
4. Total Help .21 .19 -.07 
5. Helping Accuracy .14 -.28** .01 -.10 
6. IQ .15 -.21 .19 .26* 
Note. Unless indicated otherwise, n=52. 
a 
n=31. 
*_e<.03 
**£<.02 
5 
.01 
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exhibits an empathy deficit (Gough, 1948; Hare, 1970; 
McCord & McCord, 1956). In this study, psychopathic de-
linquents were hypothesized (H2 and H3) to exhibit less 
emotional and cognitive empathy than a neurotic or a gen-
eral cornparisongroup of delinquents. In Table 3, the means 
and standard deviations of the affective and cognitive mea-
sures of empathy are included. These data were analyzed 
according to delinquency groups with a one-way analysis of 
variance statistic. Contrary to the hypothesis, there were 
no significant differences between delinquency groups on 
the emotional empathy measure, F(2,49) = 1.62. However 
the delinquency groups did differ significantly on the cog-
nitive measure of empathy, F(2,49) = 5.20, p<.009. A pos-
teriori analysis showed the psychopathic delinquent group 
to be significantly poorer in perspective-taking skills 
than the neurotic delinquency group, t(49) = 2.72, p<.Ol 
and the comparison group, t(49) = 2.99, p<.Ol. There was 
no significant difference between the neurotic and com-
parison groups in cognitive empathy scores, t(49) = .47. 
Thus, only the hypothesis concerning differences in cogni-
tive empathy was confirmed. 
Cognitive/Affective Empathy 
and Helping 
Since empathy has been considered a motivator of 
helping behavior (Iannotti, Note 6), it was hypothesized 
(H4 and H5) that both the cognitive and affective measures 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of Empathy Measures by 
Empathy 
Measure 
Emotional 
M 
SD 
Cognitive 
M 
SD 
an 
= 11. 
b 9. n = 
c 32. n = 
Delinquency Group 
a Psychopathy 
16.64 
6.02 
6.18 
2.86 
Delinquency Group 
t . b Neuro 1.c 
19.78 
3.53 
9.11 
2.26 
c Contrast 
19.19 
4.08 
8.69 
2.26 
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of empathy would significantly correlate with the helping 
measures so that high scorers on the empathy measures would 
demonstrate more helping behvior. As can be seen in Table 
2, the relationship between empathy and helping behavior 
was not as predicted. The emotional empathy measures did 
not significantly correlate with the accuracy of help mea-
sure and only approached a significant positive correlation 
with the total help measure (E_<.07). The Detachment measu:t'e 
of empathy did not correlate significantly with either 
helping measure. Cognitive empathy did not correlate sig-
nificantly with the total help measure, but, did correlate 
significantly negatively with the accuracy of help measure. 
The significant relationship between cognitive empathy and 
help accuracy was opposite from the predicted direction so 
that a subject who exhibited poorer perspective-taking 
skills also exhibited greater accuracy or quality of help. 
Overall, the significant relationship, as predicted 
in the review of the literature, between helping and em-
pathy was not observed. The one significant correlation 
between the cognitive measure of empathy and helping ac-
curacy was in the opposite direction of that predicted. 
Empathy Manipulation, Psychopathy, 
and Helping 
The relationships between empathy, psychopathy and 
helping behavior were also investigated in an experimental 
situation. It was hypothesized (H6) that subjects given 
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empathy inducing instructions would help significantly more 
than those given empathy inhibiting instructions. Con-
sidering the psychopath's observed deficit in empathic 
ability, it was further hypothesized (H7) that the psycho-
pathic delinquent would demonstrate significantly less 
helping behavior than the other delinquency groups. The 
psychopathic delinquent was also hypothesized (H8) to ex-
hibit less helping behavior than the neurotic delinquent 
under empathy inducing instructions. 
Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations 
for the total help and accuracy of help measures. These 
data are presented according to observational set and de-
linquency group membership. A least squares analysis of 
variance solution for unequal sample sizes was used to in-
vestigate the hypothesized relationships for each of the 
helping measures. Each helping measure was examined ac-
cording to two levels of observational instructions (em-
pathy inducing/empathy inhibiting) and three delinquency 
subgroups (psychopath/neurotic/contrast delinquents) • 
Table 5 summarizes the analysis of variance results for 
both the total help (total number of Neuroticism scales 
scored) and accuracy of help (percentage of correctly 
scored Neuroticism scales) measures. None of the hypoth-
esized relationships were supported. Neither delinquency 
group membership, observational instructions, nor the in-
teracti6n of these two variables had any significant effect 
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations of Helping Behavior by 
Delinquency Group and Observational Set 
Delinquency Observational Helping 
Group Set Behavior 
Total Helping 
Help Accuracy 
Psychopathy Empathy 
Inducing 
M 10.83 54.06 
SD 6.94 15.69 
Empathy 
Inhibiting 
M 11.20 49.67 
SD 2.68 14.22 
Neurotic Empathy 
Inducing 
M 10.50 58.13 
SD 5.80 12.95 
Empathy 
Inhibiting 
M 12.00 61.74 
SD 2.12 29.90 
Contrast Empathy 
Inducing 
M 11.39 58.17 
SD 4.08 26.07 
Empathy 
Inhibiting 
M 9.29 51.78 
SD 4.05 31.84 
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Table 5 
Analysis of Variance Results for the Total 
Amount and the Accuracy of Help Scores 
Total Help Help Accuracy 
Source of Variance df MS F MS F 
Delinquency group (A) 2 3.87 <1.0 161.05 <1.0 
Observational set (B) 1 .06 <1.0 54.55 <1.0 
A X B 2 14.27 <1.0 86.51 <1.0 
Error 46 19.21 670.75 
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on the total amount of help or the accuracy of help given 
to the experimenter. 
Attribution, Cognitive/Affec-
tive Empathy, and Helping 
The relationship between attribution of responsibil-
ity ratings and the cognitive/affective empathy measures 
were also investigated in this study. It was hypothesized 
(H9 and Hll) that actor (Tom) and actor related (Tom's 
speech) responsibility ratings would be significantly neg-
atively correlated with the emotional empathy measure and 
the cognitive empathy measure. External environmental 
ratings (Bob, staff, luck) were hypothesized (HlO and Hl2) 
to be positively correlated with the emotional empathy mea-
sure and the cognitive measure. 
Table 6 includes correlations between the attribu-
tion of responsibility ratings and empathy, helping, socio-
economic status, and IQ measures. Actor and actor related 
variables did not correlate significantly with the emo-
tiona!, cognitive, or Detachment empathy measures. Ex-
ternal-environmental related responsibility ratings also 
did not correlate significantly with any of the empathy 
measures. Overall, none of the experimental hypotheses 
concerning cognitive/affective empathy and attribution were 
supported. 
Although predictions were not made concerning help-
ing behavior and responsibility ratings, the relationship 
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Table 6 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Between 
Attribution Ratings, Empathy, Helping, SES, 
and IQ Measures 
Attribution Ratings 
Tom's 
Variables Tom Speech Bob 
Emotional Empathy .22 .20 .07 
Cognitive Empathy -.11 -.02 -.lS 
Detachment a -.13 -.16 -.01 
Total Help .26** .3S*** -.10 
Helping Accuracy .03 -.19 .11 
IQ -.06 .13 -.30*** 
SES .07 -.20 -.20 
Note. Unless indicated otherwise, n = 52. 
an = 31. 
*E.<. OS 
**£<.03 
***_E<.Ol 
Staff 
.OS 
-.04 
.06 
.13 
.13 
.23 
-.16 
Luck 
.11 
.11 
.13 
.OS 
.06 
-.07 
.07 
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was explored. If observer-turned-actor ratings are related 
to empathy and helping is motivated by empathy, then actor 
responsibility ratings and helping should be negatively 
correlated. The data in Table 6 suggest that the total 
help measure was significantly related to actor responsi-
bility ratings but in a positive direction, i.e., subjects 
who helped more also rated the actor more responsible for 
the observed experimental situation. Again, attribution 
ratings did not correlate in the expected direction with an 
empathy related variable which raises further doubts about 
observer-turned-actor ratings being a measure of empathy. 
Experimental Manipulation, Psy-
chopathy, and Attribution 
Attribution ratings were also examined in an ex-
perimental situation with two independent variables, ob-
servational set and delinquency group membership. Re-
sponsibility ratings were completed on a 100 point scale 
with a score of 100 representing the highest degree of re-
sponsibility. Table 7 includes the means and standard de-
viations of the actor related (Tom, Tom's speech) and ex-
ternal-environmental related (Bob, staff, luck) responsi-
bility ratings. The scores are presented according to the 
three delinquency subgroups (psychopath/neurotic/contrast 
groups) and the two levels of observational instructions 
(empathy inducing/inhibiting). 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations of Attributions by 
Delinquency Group and Observational Set 
Attribution Scale 
Delinquency Observa-
Group tiona! Set Tom Speech Bob Staff Luck 
Psychopathy Empathy 
Inducing 
M 50.00 43.33 16.67 30.00 10.00 
SD 38.99 23.38 26.58 24.49 20.00 
Empathy 
Inhibiting 
M 16.00 56.80 12.00 62.00 21.00 
SD 23.02 25.47 16.43 25.88 28.81 
Neurotic Empathy 
Inducing 
M 10.00 17.50 12.50 40.00 30.00 
SD 20.00 20.62 15.00 27.08 35.59 
Empathy 
Inhibiting 
M 14.00 29.00 0.0 31.00 1.00 
SD 19.49 27.93 0.0 41.90 2.24 
Contrast Empathy 
Inducing 
M 16.39 20.00 7.50 45.56 30.83 
SD 25.77 25.84 23.47 29.70 33.49 
Empathy 
Inhibiting 
M 27.14 27.86 20.00 39.29 44.29 
SD 18.58 20.45 24.18 36.89 37.15 
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Actor ratings. Under empathy inducing observational 
instructions, actor and actor related items were hypoth-
esized (Hl3) to be rated less responsible for the distress 
situation than under empathy inhibiting instructions. Neu-
rotic delinquents were also hypothesized (Hl5) to rate the 
actor variables less responsible than the psychopathic de-
linquents under empathy inducing instructions. A 2x3 least 
squares analysis of variance for unequal sample sizes was 
used to examine the hypotheses concerning the actor vari-
ables. Table 8 presents the analysis of variance results 
for the attribution of responsibility ratings concerning 
the actor, Torn. No significant main effects were observed. 
Contrary to expectation, the observational set, empathy 
inhibiting and empathy inducing instructions, did not sig-
nificantly alter responsibility ratings. 
A significant Observational Set by Delinquency Group 
interaction was observed, F(2,46) = 3.34, p<.04. Figure 1 
graphically portrays the mean attribution of responsibility 
ratings for Torn by delinquency group and observational set. 
Examination reveals that under empathy inducing instruc-
tions, neurotic and contrast group delinquents rated the 
actor less responsible than the psychopathic delinquents. 
A simple effects analysis of the delinquency groups' actor 
ratings obtained under empathy inducing instructions sup-
ports the observation that this instructional set did sig-
nificantly affect the delinquency groups' ratings. Under 
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Table 8 
Analysis of Variance Results for Attribution of 
Responsibility Ratings for Tom 
Source of Variance df MS F 
Delinquency group (A) 2 1,099.82 1.79 
Observational set (B) 1 392.53 <1.00 
AXB 2 2,049.48 3.34* 
Error 46 613.39 
*£<.04 
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Figure 1. The mean attribution of responsibility ratings for Tom by 
delinquency group and observational set. 
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the empathy inducing instructional set, psychopathic delin-
quents rated the actor significantly more responsible than 
either the neurotic group, t(46) = 3.88, £<.05, or the con-
trast group, t(46) = 3.88, £<.05. There was no significant 
difference in actor ratings under empathy inducing instruc-
tions between the neurotic and contrast delinquency groups, 
t(46)= <1.0. The simple effects analysis for the delin-
quency groups' actor ratings obtained under empathy in-
hibiting instructions was not significant, F(2,46) = <1.0, 
suggesting that this observational set did not produce dif-
ferent effects for the delinquency groups. 
Simple effects analyses of observational instruc-
tions for each of the delinquency groups were also com-
pleted. There was no significant difference in performance 
under empathy inducing or empathy inhibiting instructions 
for the contrast group, F(l,46) = <1.0, or the neurotic 
group, ~(1,46) = <1.0. However, the analysis of the ob-
servation conditions for the psychopathy group was signifi-
cant, F(l,46) = 5.99, £<.01, suggesting that psychopaths 
rated the actor more responsible for the distress situation 
under empathy inducing instructions than empathy inhibiting 
instructions. 
The simple effects analyses of the actor ratings 
suggest that the empathy inhibiting instructions had no 
differential effect on any of the delinquency groups and 
that there were no significant differences in performance 
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between the two observational sets for either neurotics or 
the contrast group. The significant simple effects ap-
peared with the psychopathy group's performance under em-
pathy inducing instructions. The psychopathy group re-
sponded to empathy inducing instructions with higher actor 
responsibility ratings. 
Actor characteristics (Tom's speech) were also ex-
pected to be rated in a manner similar to the actor ratings. 
Tom's manner of speech was hypothesized to be rated less 
responsible for the distress situation under empathy in-
ducing instructions than under empathy inhibiting instruc-
tions. Neurotic delinquents were also hypothesized to rate 
Tom's speech less responsible than psychopaths under em-
pathy inducing instructions. Table 9 includes the analysis 
of variance summary for Tom's speech ratings by delinquency 
group and observational set. Contrary to the above predic-
tions, the observational instructions did not alter re-
sponsibility ratings of Tom's speech. Also, no significant 
interaction effect was observed. 
The significant delinquency group main effect for 
Tom's speech responsibility ratings was not expected. Spe-
cifically, the mean attribution of responsibility ratings 
concerning Tom's manner of speech showed that the psycho-
pathic delinquents assigned more responsibility to Tom's 
manner of speech (M = 50.06) than either the neurotic group 
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Table 9 
Analysis of Variance Results for Attribution of 
Responsibility Ratings Concerning Tom's 
Manner of Speech 
Source of Variance df MS F 
Delinquency group (A) 2 2,969.27 5.15* 
Observational set (B) 1 1,141.74 1.98 
A X B 2 36.32 <1.00 
Error 46 576.28 
*£<.01 
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(M = 23.25) or the contrast group (M = 23.93), F(2,46) = 
5.15, £<.01. 
External-environmental ratings. It was hypoth-
esized (Hl4) that under empathy inducing instructions, ob-
servers would rate such external-environmental variables as 
luck, detention center staff, and the potential helper, 
Bob, as more responsible for Tom's distress than under em-
pathy inhibiting instructions. Neurotic delinquents were 
also expected (Hl6) to rate the external-environmental 
variables less responsible for the distress situation under 
empathy inducing instructions than the psychopathic delin-
quents. 
A 2x3 least squares analysis of variance for un-
equal sample sizes was completed for each of the external-
environmental variables (luck, staff, Bob). Table 10 sum-
marizes the analysis of variance results for responsibility 
ratings attributed to Bob, the detention center staff, and 
luck. Contrary to the above hypothesis, no significant 
main effect for observational set was observed for any of 
the external-environmental responsibility ratings. Also, 
no significant Observational Set by Delinquency Group in-
teraction was observed for any of these ratings. 
Unexpectedly, the delinquency group main effect for 
the luck ratings approached significance, F(2,46) = 2.95, 
£<.06. Examination of mean luck responsibility ratings 
Table 10 
Analysis of Variance Results for External-Environmental Attribution 
of Responsibility Ratings 
Attribution Scale 
Bob Staff Luck 
Source of 
Variance df MS F MS F MS F 
- - - -
Delinquency group (A) 2 216.41 <1.0 277.83 <1.0 2,957.97 2.95 
Observational set (B) 1 23.08 <1.0 296.61 <1.0 21.92 <1.0 
A X B 2 687.69 1.42 1,628.66 1.57 1,612.72 1.61 
Error 46 483.71 1,034.51 1,003.16 
1-' 
1-' 
ol:ao 
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revealed that the contrast group (M = 37.56) rated luck 
more responsible than either the neurotic (M = 15.50) or the 
psychopathic delinquent (M = 15.50) groups. This suggests 
that the contrast group perceived the taped distress situ-
ation more like the distressed actor on the tape would be 
expected to perceive the situation than how an uninvolved 
observer would be expected to perceive the situation. How-
ever, the delinquency group main effect did not occur for 
the other two external-environmental ratings which weakens 
the above observation. 
Classification 
Throughout the discussion of psychopathic delin-
quency, the importance of empathy and perspective-taking 
skills have been stressed. It was suggested that deficits 
in_empathy are at the core of the psychopath's disability 
(McCord & McCord, 1956). If this is true, then scores on 
the empathy measures should differentiate psychopathic de-
linquency from the neurotic and contrast juvenile offenders. 
A stepwise discriminant analysis was completed on all of 
the subjects using the emotional empathy scores, egocentrism 
scores, attribution ratings, helping scores, and IQ. The F 
level for inclusion and deletion with stepwise procedure 
was set at 1.00. 
Table 11 illustrates the two discriminant functions 
set up to classify the subjects. Each function is presented 
Function 
1 
2 
*£<.0002 
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Table 11 
Stepwise Discriminant Functions 
Percentage 
Eigen- of Wilks 
Value Variance Lambda df 
0.819 86.12 .485 10 
0.132 13.88 .883 4 
2 
X 
33.96* 
5.83 
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with its corresponding eigenvalue, Wilks lambda score, the 
percentage of variance it accounts for, and the chi-square 
score. Only the first function exhibited significant dis-
criminating power. 
The five variables which satisfied the inclusion 
criteria are presented in Table 12. Each variable is pre-
sented along with its respective standardized discriminant 
function coefficients. The attribution ratings and ego-
centrism scores were the best predictors of inclusion in 
the delinquency subgroups. Subjects rating Tom's manner of 
speech as responsible for his predicament and subjects ex-
hibiting poor perspective-taking skills were more likely to 
be included in the psychopathy group. Low luck attribu-
tions, low emotional empathy scores, and lower IQ scores 
also contributed to discriminating psychopaths from neu-
rotics. 
The discriminant functions were successful in 
classifying 76.1% of the subjects into one of the three 
delinquency subgroups utilizing the five variables. Table 
13 includes the percentage of predicted group membership 
for the three subgroups. The discriminant functions were 
able to correctly classify 63.6% of the psychopathic de-
linquents and 93.8% of the contrast group. However, cor-
rect prediction of the neurotic group was very low (11.1%). 
In fact, most of the neurotic delinquents were classified 
in the contrast group. The discriminant function appeared 
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Table 12 
Variables Utilized in Discriminant Analysis 
Standardized Discriminant 
Coefficient 
Variables Function 1 Function 2 
1. Cognitive 
Empathy -.614 .132 
2. Tom's Speech 
Attribution .890 -.079 
3. Luck 
Attribution -.399 -.697 
4. Emotional 
Empathy -.501 .169 
5. IQ -.015 .639 
Delinquency 
Groups 
Psychopath 
Neurotic 
Contrast 
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Table 13 
Classification of Delinquency Using 
N 
11 
9 
32 
Discriminant Functions 
Predicted Percentage 
of Group Membership 
Psychopath Neurotic 
63.60 
0.00 
6.30 
9.10 
11.10 
0.00 
Contrast 
27.30 
88.90 
93.80 
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to be successful in discriminating psychopathic delinquents 
from the neurotic and contrast groups but poor at discrim-
inating the neurotic and contrast groups. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Cognitive/Affective Empathy 
and Helping 
The results of this study offer very little support 
for the relaitonship between empathy and helping behavior 
postulated by Iannotti (Note 6) and Hoffman (1975). Ac-
cording to Hoffman, a potential helper must be able to emo-
tionally experience the distress of the person in need of 
help (affective empathy) and to cognitively separate self 
from other (perspective-taking skills) before acting in a 
helpful manner. However, neither the measure of emotional 
empathy or of perspective-taking skill showed any consis-
tent significant relationship with the helping measures. 
The one significant relationship was inconsistent with 
Hoffman's observations and suggested that as the quality 
of help increased so did the level of egocentricity. 
Since a significant relationship between the 
Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) measure of emotional empathy 
and helping had been previously reported (Eisenberg-Berg & 
Mussen, 1978), why did it not show up in this study? One 
possibility is that the experimenter failed to design a 
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believable distressful situation. Instead, the subjects 
may have misinterpreted the help manipulation and, because 
of their incarceration, viewed it as one where they could 
gain something (e.g., quicker release, favors from the 
staff). Helping in such a situation would not be motivated 
by an empathic response, but by a self-centeredness. The 
positive significant correlation between the perspective-
taking measure and one measure of helping offers partial 
support for this interpretation. The more self-centered or 
egocentric a subject was the more help was given. Subjects 
who had good perspective-taking skills might have observed 
quite accurately, that the experimenter did not really need 
help and that the situation offered no gains for them so 
they helped less. The poor-perspective-takers may not have 
perceived the situation accurately and, consequently, they 
helped more in hopes of gaining something in return. 
One important finding was the significant relation-
ship between the Detachment scale and the emotional empathy 
scale. The statistically significant correlation offers 
some validation for Schalling's (1978) Detachment scale, 
suggesting that subjects who reported more interpersonal 
detachment also exhibited less emotional empathy. However, 
the significant correlation may also be due to the similar 
methods of measurement (both self-report, true-false ques-
tionnaires) of the scales. The fact that the perspective-
taking scale and the Detachment scale did not significantly 
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correlate adds some support to a method interpretation. 
Further research examining high and low scores on the De-
tachment scale with a multimethod approach would help 
clarify the relationship observed in this study. 
The different correlation patterns between the total 
and quality of help measures adds support to Kurdek's (1978) 
observation concerning a need to look at different types of 
helping. In this study, the total help measure correlated 
significantly with IQ and suggests that subjects who helped 
more had higher intelligence scores. Although a causal re-
lationship cannot be inferred, from this correlation, the 
relationship may have occurred because of the counting 
skills and vigilance required to engage in the helping 
task. However, the quality of help me~sure was not sig-
nificantly related to intelligence. So, although both mea-
sures reflect helping behavior, only one of the helping 
measures appears to be confounded by verbal intelligence. 
Further research examining the different variables related 
to total help and quality of help measures is necessary. 
Impulsiveness or assertiveness might be an important vari-
able differentially affecting these two measures of helping 
behavior. 
Psychopathy and Cognitive/ 
Affective Empathy 
The results of this study add partial support to 
the clinical observation that psychopaths are deficient in 
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empathic ability. The psychopath's significant deficiency 
in interpersonal perspective-taking skills and the impor-
tance of perspective-taking performance in discriminating 
psychopathic delinquents from other delinquency groups fur-
ther support the importance of Gough's (1948) social role-
taking theory of psychopathy. In Gough's theory, empathy 
was conceptualized as role-taking or perspective-taking 
skills. The psychopath's deficiency in such skills dis-
rupts the socialization process leaving an egocentrically 
oriented sense-of-self and an inability to experience guilt, 
shame, embarassment, or loyalty (Hare, 1970). 
These results also point out the importance of mea-
suring both cognitive (perspective-taking) and emotional 
components of empathy when studying psychopathy. Both com-
ponents were important in discriminating psychopathic de-
linquents from other delinquent groups. However, the emo-
tional empathy measure, alone, was not able to distinguish 
among psychopaths, neurotics, and other offender groups. 
This finding suggests that the affective definition of em-
pathy may not be as important to studying psychopathy as 
hypothesized. A significant emotional empathy deficit was 
observed between delinquents and nondelinquents (Aleksic & 
Savitsky, Note 4), but in comparing subgroups of delin-
quents, such a measure may lose its discrimination power 
and the cognitive component becomes the more important 
variable~ 
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The lack of a significant difference among de-
linquency groups in emotional empathy may also have some-
thing to do with the experimental situation. The reading 
of each item to each subject, individually and the sub-
ject's incarceration status may have significantly in-
creased the demand to give socially appropriate responses. 
Such a response set would affect a self-report measure like 
the emotional empathy scale much more than it would the per-
spective-taking task. The socially appropriate response set 
would decrease the variability of empathy scores and there-
fore decrease the ability to differentiate between delin-
quency groups. 
Several items from the Personal Opinion Study {Quay 
& Parsons, 1971) which were included at the end of the emo-
tional empathy scale were checked to determine if there was 
a socially desirable response set. One such item, when 
answered true, had a factor loading of .58 {Quay & Parsons, 
1971) with the psychopathic delinquency factor and was pre-
sented as follows: "The only way to make big money is to 
steal it." However, in this study, no psychopathic de-
linquents and only 5.77% of the whcle sample answered true 
·to-thl"s item. This suggests that subjects may well have 
been answering items in a socially desirable manner. 
This study also offers some support for the con-
struct validity of the conduct problem subscale of the Be-
havior Problem Checklist. High scorers, on this subscale, 
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were hypothesized to be psychopathic delinquents and were 
expected to show a deficit in empathy. The success of the 
discriminant analysis and the significant difference in 
the cognitive empathy scores between the psychopathy group 
and the other delinquency groups supports the use of the 
conduct problem subscale as a measure of psychopathy. 
However, there is one major drawback in interpre-
ting the performance of high conduct problem scale scorers 
as psychopathy. The absence of a normal control group 
greatly limits the psychopathy interpretation. Although 
the high conduct problem scale scorers of this study re-
sponded as psychopaths were predicted to respond on the 
cognitive empathy measure, it is difficult to claim with a 
high degree of certainty that this group was actually made 
up of extreme scorers without normative data or a normal 
control group. However, there is some support for the con-
tention that the high conduct problem scorers were extreme 
scorers and can be considered to be psychopathic. First, 
the mean conduct problem score for the psychopathy group 
in this study was much higher (M = 10.91) than that re-
ported by Quay and Peterson (Note 1) for a group of normal 
·adolescent boys (M = 2.93). Second, the mean psychopathy 
group score was also considerably higher than that reported 
by Schuck et al. (1972) for a general institutionalized 
delinquency group (M = 6.67). Future research should 
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include a matched control group of normal adolescents for 
a better comparison. 
Psychopathy and Helping 
The lack of a significant relationship between 
delinquency and helping behavior which was observed in 
this study may have occurred for several reasons. As men-
tioned above, the experimental helping situation may not 
have been perceived as a real distress situation. Instead, 
subjects may have been responding to an institutional or 
situational demand to comply with the staff in all situa-
tions. It is also possible that there simply is no dif-
ference in helping behavior between different delinquency 
subgroups. The fact that Toler et al. {1976} and Stein-
berg, Payson, and Evans {1974} found hospitalized mental 
patients to be helpful, and in some cases more helpful than 
college students, supports this interpretation. Further 
investigation of psychopathy and helping behavior needs to 
be attempted to clarify the nonsignificant findings of this 
study. A more distressful helping situation like that re-
ported by Toler et al. {1976} may help maximize any differ-
ence in helping that exists between delinquency groups. 
In future research, subjects not currently residing in an 
institutional setting should also be included to check for 
any demand characteristics coming from such a situation. 
The failure of the empathy manipulation to affect 
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helping behavior and to differentially affect delinquency 
subgroups may have occurred for several reasons. Although 
a similar empathy manipulation procedure was successful in 
changing helping behavior (Aderman & Berkowitz, 1970), the 
procedure used in this study was somewhat different (e.g., 
listening to observational instructions, different tape 
content). These differences may have changed the procedure 
in such a way as to reduce its empathy inducing ability. 
For example, in this study, subjects had to listen to the 
observational instructions rather than reading them as in 
other studies. This different mode of presentation may not 
have been as effective in producing empathy. In fact, in a 
study reported by Feshbach (1978), children exhibited 
greater empathic responsiveness when materials were pre-
sented in a combined auditory-visual mode and were sig-
nificantly less responsive when material was presented in 
either an auditory or a visual mode. Further study of em-
pathy and psychopathy should include an auditory-visual 
presentation of materials to maximize empathic responsive-
ness. 
The tape content may also have been responsible for 
the general failure of the empathy manipulation. Although 
the general outline of the Aderman and Berkowitz negative 
outcome story was followed, the tape was substantially 
altered. Subjects may have been unable to imagine the situ-
ation presented to them or understand the tape characters. 
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Also, the situation on the tape may not have been perceived 
as distressing by the subjects and the emotional empathy 
created by the empathy inducing instructions would not have 
been any different than that created by the empathy in-
hibiting insturctions. 
Several subjects also complained about not being 
able to understand what occurred on the tape. Postexperi-
mental discussions with these subjects revealed that they 
had difficulty concentrating on the tape. This difficulty 
in auditory concentration or processing may have reduced 
the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation. A study by 
Bachara and Zuba (1978) suggested that juvenile delinquency 
is significantly related to learning disabilities, of which 
deficits in auditory processing may play an important role. 
Also, the significant positive correlation between IQ and 
the total amount of help measure adds further support to 
the idea that the empathy manipulation may be effected by 
a cognitive skill such as concentration. Further research 
examining auditory processing deficits in the different de-
linquency subgroups needs to be undertaken to further clarify 
this point. Empathy manipulations which do not require con-
siderable auditory or visual-perceptual processing, such as 
that reported by Aderman et al. (1975) may be more helpful 
in studying delinquency and helping behavior. 
Cognitive/Affective Empathy 
and Attribution 
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The results of this study suggest that observer-
turned-actor attributions do not significantly correlate 
with the cognitive/affective definition of empathy utilized 
in this project. However, Aderman et al. (1975) also re-
ported a nonsignificant positive correlation between a 
total emotional empathy score and attributions of respon-
sibility. The lack of consistent significant relationship 
between empathy measures and attribution of responsibility 
ratings suggest that the observer-turned-actor attribution 
may not be motivated by an empathic process. In contrast, 
several studies (Aderman et al. 1974; Brehm & Aderman, 
1977; Gould & Sigall, 1977) consistently found subjects who 
had been given empathy inducing instructions attributed 
less responsibility to victims in a negative outcome situa-
tion. What seems to be important here in understanding 
these two sets of results, is the type of empathy related 
to the observer-turned-actor attributions. The nonsignif-
icant relationship between empathy and attribution seemed 
to occur with trait measures of empathy while the signif-
icant relationships all occurred with a situationally in-
duced empathy or mood change. Differential causal attribu-
tions, then, may be more a function of situational vari-
ables, passing cognitive sets, or mood changes rather than 
a trait conceptualization of empathic ability. 
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The unexpected positive relationship between the 
total helping measure and actor attribution is quite con-
fusing and requires further experimental clarification. 
If emotional empathy is a motivator of helping behavior 
as well as observer-turned-actor attribution, then helping 
should be negatively correlated with actor attributions. 
The positive correlation may have occurred if the helping 
score and other attributions were motivated by a manipu-
lative response set. Under these conditions, subjects 
would help more in order to appear ready for release and 
would rate any person perceived to have similar problems 
more harshly. 
Psychopathy and Attribution 
The empathy manipulation alone had no significant 
effect on attribution ratings. These results do not coin-
cide with those reported by Brehm and Aderman (1977). In 
their study, subjects receiving empathy inducing instruc-
tions evaluated a victim more favorably (less responsible) 
than under empathy inhibiting instructions. Several of the 
reasons mentioned above (e.g., tape content changes, audi-
tory processing problems) may account for this discrepancy 
in results. 
The only empathy manipulation which did produce 
significant attribution ratings occurred in interaction 
with the delinquency variable for actor ratings. Psycho-
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pathic delinquents rated the actor significantly more re-
sponsible under empathy inducing instructions than either 
the neurotic or contrast groups. This interaction suggests 
that psychopathic delinquents were unable to be empathic 
and failed to blame the actor 1 s problem on external factors 
as the actor would be likely to do. Although this finding 
was in the predicted direction for the empathy inducing 
instructions, the empathy inhibiting condition failed to 
produce significant differences in any group's attribution 
ratings. Neurotics were expected to rate the actor more 
responsible under empathy inhibiting instructions but, no 
significant difference was observed. Since there were no 
significant interactions or observational set main effects 
for the other responsibility ratings concerning Tom's 
speech, luck, staff, and Bob, the one significant inter-
action for the actor ratings may have been a random result. 
Further consideration of empathy instructions on attribution 
of responsibility ratings for different pathology groups 
should be pursued. Presentation of a visual situation like 
that reported by Aderman et al. (1974) may be more easily 
processed by delinquency groups and produce more consistent 
results. 
An unexpected significant main effect for delin-
quency groups was observed for the actor's speech ratings. 
Psychopathic delinquents rated Tom's speech significantly 
more responsible for the distress situation than either 
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the neurotic or contrast groups. It is possible that this 
result occurred because of differing interpersonal con-
struct systems in psychopaths. The actor in the taped situ-
ation was set up as a victim. To many, the concept of 
"victim" may carry with it implications of powerlessness, 
pain, and injustice. However, Widom (1976) demonstrated 
that psychopaths exhibited extreme idiosyncratic construct 
patterning when compared to a normal control group. The 
construct of victim may not carry the same implications for 
the psychopath as for other delinquency groups. Instead, 
victim may carry implications of repulsiveness and weak-
ness. Harsher responsibility ratings may then follow from 
these different construct implications. Further research 
studying the connection between attribution, construct 
patterning, and psychopathy would help clarify the rela-
tionship. 
In summary, this study adds partial support to a 
research approach which conceptualizes empathy as both a 
cognitive skill and an emotional response. However, the 
problems and difficulties of operationalizing empathy were 
also evident in this study. The different empathy measures 
did not correlate significantly with each other or with 
the helping measures as was expected. This raises the 
question of whether the empathy measures utilized in this 
study really do represent the theoretical conceptualiza-
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tions of empathy or do they represent other processes such 
as insight or projection? Unfortunately, an answer to 
this question is not possible from the results of this 
study and the search for an accurate measure of empathy 
must continue. 
The one clear finding from this study is that 
psychopathic delinquents .are significantly poorer at per-
spective-taking skills than the other delinquency groups. 
This is important when considering rehabilitation of the 
delinquent. Certain treatment approaches may be used more 
appropriately with psychopathic delinquents than with neu-
rotic delinquents. For example, the role-taking skills 
training utilized by Chandler (1973) might be more ef-
fectively put to use with psychopathic delinquents than 
with just a general delinquency group. Further examina-
tion of role-taking skills training with different de-
linquency groups is indicated considering the significant 
perspective-taking skills deficit of psychopathic delin-
quents when compared to other delinquency groups. 
SUMMARY 
The main purpose of this study was to examine dif-
ferences in empathic ability and helping behavior which may 
exist between psychopathic and neurotic delinquents. There 
were 52 adolescent males who were randomly assigned either 
empathy inducing or empathy inhibiting observational in-
structions and listened to a taped negative outcome distress 
situation. Following the tape, subjects were asked to make 
attribution of responsibility ratings and to help the ex-
perimenter complete scoring some questionnaire responses. 
Each subject then completed two self-report measures of af-
fective empathy, Chandler's cognitive perspective-taking 
measure, and a measure of verbal intelligence. Using scores 
from the Behavior Problem Checklist, 11 boys were identified 
as psychopaths, 9 boys were identified as neurotics, and 32 
boys were identified as a comparison group of delinquents. 
A number of predicitons were made concerning the re-
lationships between the affective, cognitive, and attribu-
tion measures of empathy. There were no significant cor-
relations between the affective, cognitive, or attribution 
measure of empathy. However, the two measures of affective 
empathy, which included a revised Mehrabian emotional em-
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pathy scale and Schalling's Detachment subscale, did sig-
nificantly correlate so that subjects reporting more inter-
personal detachment also reported less emotional empathy. 
Empathy and help measures were expected to be posi-
tively correlated so that subjects who helped more would 
also exhibit more empathy. There were no significant cor-
relations in the predicted direction between the affective, 
cognitive, and attribution measures of empathy and the total 
or quality of help scores. 
Psychopathic delinquents were hypothesized to lack 
empathic ability and exhibit less helping behavior than the 
other delinquency groups. Psychopathic delinquents demon-
strated significantly poorer cognitive empathy than either 
the neurotic or comparison groups. No significant differ-
ences between delinquency groups were observed on the emo-
tional empathy scale, the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, 
or a measure of socioeconomic status. No significant dif-
ferences in total help or quality of help scores were ob-
served for delinquency groups, observational sets, or their 
interaction. 
Actor and external-environmental attribution of re-
sponsibility ratings were expected to vary with observa-
tional instructions and delinquency group membership. How-
ever, no consistent pattern of responsibility ratings 
emerged in this study. Contrary to expectation, responsi-
bility ratings did not significantly vary according to 
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observational set. Psychopathic delinquents did rate an 
actor-related variable (manner of speech) significantly 
more responsible for the outcome than the other delinquency 
groups, but there were no other significant delinquency 
group differences in responsibility ratings. Psychopathic 
delinquents also rated the actor of the taped distress 
situation more responsible under empathy inducing instruc-
tions than the neurotic or comparison delinquency groups. 
No other significant delinquency group by observational set 
interaction for attribution ratings was observed. 
Empathy, helping, and IQ measures were utilized in 
a discriminant analysis to classify delinquency group mem-
bership. Psychopathic delinquents were successfully dif-
ferentiated from the other groups using the cognitive em-
pathy, emotional empathy, luck attribution, actor's speech 
attribution, and IQ measures. 
These results are discussed in relation to a cogni-
tive/affective definition of empathy, Hoffman's theory of 
helping behavior, and the clinical observations of an em-
pathy deficit in psychopathy. Specific suggestions for 
future investigations were also made. 
REFERENCE NOTES 
1. Quay, H. C., & Peterson, D. R. Manual for the Behavior 
Problem Checklist. Unpubiished manuscript, University 
of Illinois, 1975. 
2. Quay, H. C. The differential classification of the 
adult male offender. Unpublished manuscript, Temple 
University, 1974. 
3. Iannotti, R. J., & Meacham, J. A. The nature, measure-
ment, and development of empathy. Paper presented at 
the Meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, 
Philadelphia, April, 1974. 
4. Aleksic, P.M., & Savitsky, J. c. ·Validation of a test 
of emotional empathy among adolescent offenders. Un-
published manuscript, 1975. 
5. Iannotti, R. J. The many faces of empathy: An analysis 
of the definition and evaluation of empathy in children. 
Paper presented at the Meeting of the Society for Re-
search in Child Development, Denver, April, 1975. 
6. Iannotti, R. J. Empathy as a motivator of altruistic 
behavior. Paper presented at a meeting of the American 
Psychological Association, New Orleans, August, 1974. 
138 
139 
7. Iannotti, R. J. The longitudinal investigation of 
role-taking, altruism, and empathy. Paper presented 
at the Meeting of the Society for Research in Child 
Development, New Orleans, March, 1977. 
REFERENCES 
Aderman, D. Elation, depression, and helping behavior. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
1972, 24, 91-101. 
Aderman, D., Archer, R. L., & Harris, J. L. Effect of 
emotional empathy on attribution of responsibility. 
Journal of Personality, 1975, il, 156-167. 
Aderman, D., & Berkowitz, L. Observational set, empathy, 
and helping. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1970, 14, 141-148. 
Aderman, D., Brehm, s. s., & Katz, L. B. Empathic observa-
tion of an innocent victim: The just world re-
visited. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 1974, ~, 342-347. 
Akamatsy, T. J., & Farudi, P. A. Effects of model status 
and juvenile offender type on the imitation of self-
reward criteria. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 1978, ~, 187-188. 
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statis-
tical manual of mental disorders. Washington, D.C.: 
Author, 1968. 
Aronfreed, J. The socialization of altruistic and sympa-
thetic behavior: Some theoretical and experimental 
140 
141 
analyses. In J. R. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz {Eds.), 
Altruism and helping behavior. New York: Academic 
Press, 1970. 
Ax, A. F. Psychophysiological methodology for the study of 
schizophrenia. In R. Ressler & N. Greenfield {Eds.), 
Physiological correlates of psychological disorder. 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962. 
Bachara, G. H., & Zaba, J. N. Learning disabilities and 
juvenile delinquency. Journal of Learning Disabil-
ities, 1978, 11, 242-246. 
Berg, N. I. Self-concept of neurotic and sociopathic 
criminal offenders. Psychological Reports, 1974, 
l!r 622. 
Berger, S. M. Conditioning through viGarious instigation. 
Psychological Review, 1962, 69, 450-466. 
Berkowitz, L. The self, selfishness, and altruism. In 
J. R. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz {Eds.), Altruism and 
helping behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1970. 
Blackburn, R. An empirical classification of psychopathic 
personality. British Journal of Psychiatry, 1975, 
1271 456-460 • 
Blackburn, R. Psychopathy and personality: The dimen-
sionality of self report and behavior rating data in 
abnormal offenders. British Journal of Social and 
Clinical Psychology, 1979, 18, 111-119. 
142 
Borke, H. Interpersonal perception of young children: 
Egocentrism or empathy. Developmental Psychology, 
1971, ~, 263-269. 
Borke, H. The development of empathy in Chinese and Ameri-
can children between three and six years of age: A 
cross cultural study. Developmental Psychology, 
1973, 2, 102-108. 
Borkovec, T. D. Autonomic reactivity to sensory stimula-
tion in psychopathic, neurotic and normal juvenile 
delinquents. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 1970, ~, 217-222. 
Brehm, S. s., & Aderman, D. On the relationship between 
empathy and the actor versus observer hypothesis. 
Journal of Research in Fersonaltty, 1977, 11, 
340-346. 
Blirka, A.· A., & Glenwick, D. s. Egocentrism and classroom 
adjustment. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 
19781 ~~ 61-70 o 
Buss, A. H. Psychopathology. New York: Wiley, 1966. 
Chandler, M. J. Egocentrism in normal and pathological 
child development. In F. Monks, w. Hartup, & J. 
DeWitt (Eds.), Determinants of behavioral develop-
ment. New York: Academic Press, 1972. 
Chandler, M. J. The picture arrangement subtest of the 
WAIS as an index of social egocentrism: A compara-
143 
tive study of normal and emotionally disturbed chil-
dren. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 1973, 
1, 340-349. (a) 
Chandler, M. J. Egocentrism and antisocial behavior: The 
assessment and training of social perspective-taking 
skills. Developmental Psychology, 1973, ~, 326-
332. (b) 
Chandler, M. J. Social cognition: A selective review of 
current research. In W. F. Overton & J. M. Gallagher 
(Eds.), Knowledge and development {Vol. I). New 
York: Plenum, 1977. 
Chandler, M. J., & Greenspan, s. Ersatz egocentrism: A 
reply to H. Barke. Developmental Psychology, 1972, 
z, 104-106. 
Chandler, M. J., Greenspan, s., & Barenboim, c. Assessment 
and training of role-taking and referential communi-
cation skills in institutionalized emotionally dis-
turbed children. Developmental Psychology, 1974, 
10, 546-553. 
Chaplin, M. v., & Keller, H. R. Decentering and social 
interaction. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 
1974, 124, 269-275. 
Clark, K. B. Empathy: A neglected topic in psychological 
research. American Psychologist, 1980, ~, 187-190. 
Cleckley, H. The mask of sanity {5th ed.). St. Louis, 
Mo.: Mosby, 1976. 
144 
Coleman, R. P. Social class in Kansas City. Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 
Illinois, 1959. 
Duff, A. Psychopathy and moral understanding. American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 1977, !!' 189-200. 
Dunn, L. M. Manual for the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. 
Circle Pines, Minn.: American Guidance Service, 1965. 
Dymond, R. F. Personality and empathy. Journal of Consult-
ing Psychology, 1950, 14, 343-350. 
Eaves, R. c. Teacher race, student race and the Behavior 
Problem Checklist. Journal of Abnormal Child Psy-
chology, 1975, 1, 1-10. 
Eisenberg-Berg, N., & Mussen, P. Empathy and moral develop-
ment in adolescence. Developmental Psychology, 1978, 
14, 185-186. 
Emler, N. P., & Rushton, J. P. Cognitive-developmental 
factors in children's generosity. British Journal 
of Social and Clinical Psychology, 1974, 13, 277-281. 
Emmons, T. D., & Webb, w. w. Subjective correlates of emo-
tional responsivity and stimulation seeking in psy-
chopaths, normals, and acting-out neurotics. Journal 
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1974, ~' 620. 
Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. Eysenck personality 
inventory. San Diego, Calif.: Educational and In-
dustrial Testing Services, 1968. 
145 
Feshbach, N. D. Studies of empathic behavior in children. 
In B. Maher (Ed.), Progress in experimental per-
sonality research (Vol. 8). New York: Academic 
Press, 1978. 
Feshbach, N., & Feshbach, s. The relationship between 
empathy and aggression in two age groups. Develop-
mental Psychology, 1969, 1, 102-107. 
Feshbach, N.D., & Roe, K. Empathy in six and seven year 
olds. Child Development, 1968, ~' 133-145. 
Fiske, s. T., Taylor, S. E., Etcoff, N. L., & Laufer, J. K. 
Imaging, empathy, and causal attribution. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 1979, 15, 356-377. 
Flavell, J., Botkin, P., Fry, c., Wright, J., & Jarvis, P. 
The development of role-taking and communication 
skills in children. New York: Wiley, 1968. 
Ford, M. E. The construct validity of egocentrism. Psy-
chological Bulletin, 1979, ~' 1169-1188. 
Galper, R. E. Turning observers into actors: Differential 
causal attributions as a function of empathy. 
Journal of Research in Personality, 1976, 10, 328-335. 
Geer, J. H., & Jarmecky, L. The effect of being responsible 
for reducing another's pain on subject's response 
and arousal. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 1973, ~' 232-237. 
Gough, H. G. A sociological theory of psychopathy. Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology, 1948, ~' 359-366. 
146 
Gould, R., & Sigal!, H. The effects of empathy and outcome 
on attribution: An examination of the divergent 
perspectives hypothesis. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 1977, !lr 480-489. 
Green, s. K. Causal attribution of emotion and its rela-
tionship to role-taking and helping behavior in chil-
dren. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Loyola Uni-
versity of Chicago, 1975. 
Hare, R. D. Psychopathy: Theory and research. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970. 
Hare, R. D. Psychopathy. In P. Venables & M. Christie 
(Eds.), Research in psychophysiology. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1975. 
Hare, R. D. Electrodermal and cardiovascular correlates 
of psychopathy. In R. D. Hare & D. Schalling 
(Eds.), Psychopathic behavior: Approaches tore-
search. London: Wiley, 1978. 
Hare, R. D., & Cox, D. N. Clinical and empirical concep-
tions of psychopathy, and the selection of subjects 
for research. In R. D. Hare, & D. Schalling (Eds.), 
Psychopathic behavior: Approaches to research. 
London: Wiley, 1978. (a) 
Hare, R. D., & Cox, D. N. Psychophysiological research on 
psychopathy. In W. M. Reid (Ed.), The psychopath: 
A comprehensive study of antisocial disorders and 
behaviors. New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1978. (b) 
147 
Hoffman, M. L. Developmental synthesis of affect and cog-
nition and its implications for altruistic motiva-
tion. Developmental Psychology, 1975, 11, 607-622. 
Hoffman, M. L. Empathy, role-taking, guilt, and development 
of altruistic motives.- InT. Likona (Ed.), Moral 
development and behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart, 
& Winston, 1976. 
Hoffman, M. L. Sex differences in empathy and related be-
haviors. Psychological Bulletin, 1977, ~' 712-722. 
House, T. H., & Milligan, w. L. Autonomic responses to 
modeled distress in prison psychopaths. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 1!, 556-560. 
Hundleby, J.D., & Ross, B. E. Comparison of measures of 
psychopathy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 1977, !lr 702-703. 
Iannotti, R. J. 
children. 
21-25. 
The nature and measurement of empathy in 
The Counseling Psychologist, 1975, 2, 
Iannotti, R. J. Effect of role-taking experiences on role-
taking, empathy, altruism, and aggression. Develop-
mental Psychology, 1978, 14, 119-124. 
Jones, E. E., & Nesbitt, R. E. The actor and the observer: 
Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. 
Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1971. 
Jurkovic, G. J., & Prentice, N. M. Relation of moral and 
148 
cognitive development to dimensions of juvenile de-
linquency. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1977, 
!§_, 414-420. 
Karpman, B. The myth of the psychopathic personality. 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 1948, 104, 523-534. 
Karylowski, J. Explaining altruistic behavior: A review. 
Polish Psychological Bulletin, 1977, ~, 27-34. 
Kipnis, D. Studies in character structure. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 1968, ~, 217-227. 
Krebs, D. Empathy and altruism. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 1975, ~, 1134-1146. 
Kurdek, L. A. Perspective taking as the cognitive basis 
of children's moral development: A review of the 
literature. Merrill-Palmar Quarterly, 1978, 24, 
3-28. 
Langer, J. Theories of development. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, & Winston, 1969. 
Lewis, A. Psychopathic personality: A most elusive cate-
gory. Psychological Medicine, 1974, i, 133-140. 
Looft, w. R. Egocentrism and social interaction across 
the life span. Psychological Bulletin, 1972, ~, 
73-92. 
Mack, J. L. Behavior ratings on recidivist and non-
recidivist delinquent males. Psychological Reports, 
1969, 25, 260. 
149 
McCord, W., & McCord, J. Psychopathy and delinquency. 
New York: Grune & Stratton, 1956. 
McCord, W. , & McCord, J. ~T..;;.:h;...;e:.....J;p.....,s;;,..,y~c..;;.:h;...;o-=.p_;a_t..;;.:h.;;..;;..: _..;;..An;:..;;.:;__e;;...s;;..s~a .... y___.:o;...;n,;;__t~h=e 
criminal mind. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1964. 
Mead, G. H. Mind, self, and society. 
of Chicago Press, 1934. 
Chicago: University 
Mehrabian, A., & Epstein, N. A measure of emotional em-
pathy. Journal of Personality, 1972, !Q, 525-543. 
Midlarsky, E., & Bryan, J. H. Affect expressions and chil-
dren's imitative altruism. Journal of Experimental 
Research in Personality, 1972, ~, 195-203. 
Moore, B. s., Underwood, B., & Rosenhan, D. L. Affect and 
altruism. Developmental Psychology, 1973, ~, 99-104. 
Morrison, H. L. The asocial child: A destiny of sociopath? 
In W. Reid (Ed.), The psychopath: A comparative 
study of antisocial disorders and behaviors. New 
York: Brunner/Mazel, 1978. 
Peterson, D. R., Quay, H. c., & Cameron, G. R. Personality 
and background factors in juvenile delinquency as 
inferred from questionnaire responses. Journal of 
Consulting Psychology, 1959, ~' 395-399. 
Peterson, D. R., Quay, H. C., & Tiffany, T. L. 
factors related to juvenile delinquency. 
Develppment, 1961, ~, 355-372. 
Personality 
Child 
Proger, B. B., Mann, L., Green, P. A., Bayuk, R. J., & 
Burger, R. M. Discriminators of clinically defined 
150 
emotional maladjustment: Predictive validities of 
the Behavior Problem Checklist and Devereaux Scales. 
Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 1975, lr 
71-82. 
Quay, H. c. Personality dimensions in delinquent males as 
inferred from the factor analysis of behavior ratings. 
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 1964, 
1, 33-37. 
Quay, H. C. Personality patterns in pre adolescent de-
linquent boys. Educational and Psychological Mea-
surement, 1966, ~, 99-110. 
Quay, H. c. Patterns of aggression, withdrawal, and im-
maturity. In H. C. Quay & J. s. Werry (Eds.), 
Psychopathological Disorders of. Childhood. New 
York: Wiley, 1972. 
Quay, H. C., Galvin, J.P., Annesley, F. K., & Werry, J. s. 
The modification of problem behavior and academic 
achievement in a resource room. Journal of School 
Psychology, 1978, 10, 187-188. 
Quay, H. C., & Parsons, L. The differential behavioral 
classification of the juvenile offenders. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Bureau of Prisons, 1971. 
Quay, H. C., & Peterson, D. R. A brief scale for juvenile 
delinquency. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 1958 
14, 139-142. 
151 
Reed, C. F., & Cuadra, c. A. The role-taking hypothesis in 
delinquency. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 1957, 
21, 386-390. 
Regen, D., & Totten, J. Empathy and attribution: Turning 
observers into actors. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 1975, ~, 850-856. 
Reid, W. H. The psychopath: A comprehensive study of 
antisocial disorders and behaviors. New York: 
Brunner/Mazel, 1978. 
Rime, B., Bouvy, H., Leborgne, B., & Rouillon, F. Psy-
chopathy and nonverbal behavior in an interpersonal 
situation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1978, 
.!Z_, 636-643. 
Robins, E. Antisocial and dyssocial personality disorders. 
In A. M. Freedman & H. J. Kaplan (Eds.), Compre-
hensive Textbook of Psychiatry. Baltimore: William 
& Wilkins, Co., 1967. 
Rogers, c. R. The necessary and sufficient conditions of 
therapeutic personality change. Journal of Con-
sulting Psychology, 1957, 21, 95-103. 
Rotenberg, M. Conceptual and methodological notes on af-
fective and cognitive role-taking (sympathy and 
empathy) : An illustrative experiment with delinquent 
and nondelinquent boys. Journal of Genetic Psy-
chology, 1974, 125, 177-185. 
152 
Rotenberg, M. Psychopathy, insensitivity, and sensitiza-
tion. Professional Psychology, 1975, ~, 283-292. 
Rotenberg, M. Psychopathy and differential insensitivity. 
In R. D. Hare & D. Schalling (Eds.), Psychopathic 
Behavior: Approaches to research. London: Wiley, 
1978. 
Rotenberg, M., & Diamond, B. L. The biblical conception of 
psychopathy: The law of the stubborn and rebellious 
son. Journal of the History of the Behavioral 
Sciences, 1971, 2, 29-38. 
Rubin, K. H. Role taking in childhood: Some methodological 
considerations. Child Development, 1978, ~, 
428-433. 
Rubin, K. H., & Schneider, R. W. The relationship between 
moral judgment, egocentrism, and altruistic behavior. 
Child Development, 1973, !!, 661-665. 
Rushton, J. P. Socialization and the altruistic behavior 
of children. Psychological Bulletin, 1976, ~, 
898-913. 
Rushton, J. P., & Wiener, J. Altruism and cognitive de-
velopment in children. British Journal of Social 
and Clinical Psychology, 1975, !!, 341-349. 
Savitsky, J. C., & Czyzewski, D. The reaction of adolescent 
offenders and nonoffenders to nonverbal emotion dis-
plays. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 1978, 
~, 89-96. 
153 
Schalling, D. Psychopathy-related personality variables 
and the psychophysiology of socialization. In R. D. 
Hare & D. Schalling (Eds.), The psychopath: A 
comprehensive study of antisocial disorders and be-
haviors. New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1978. 
Schuck, s. z., Dubeck, J. A., Cyrnbalisty, B. Y., & Green, C. 
Delinquency, personality tests and relationships to 
measures of guilt and adjustment. Psychological 
Reports, 1972, l!r 219-226. 
Schultz, E. w., Salvia, J., & Feinn, J. Deviant behaviors 
in rural elementary school children. Journal of 
Abnormal Child Psychology, 1973, !r 378-389. 
Shantz, c. U. The development of social cognition. In 
E. M. Hetherington (Ed.), Review of child develop-
ment research (Vol. 5). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975. 
Siegel, R. A. Probability of punishment and suppression 
of behavior in psychopathic and non psychopathic 
offenders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1978, 
87, 514-522. 
Smith, R. J. The psychopath in society. New York: Aca-
demic Press, 1978. 
Spielberger, C. D., Kling, J. K., & O'Hagen, s. E. J. 
Dimensions of psychopathic personality: Antisocial 
behavior and anxiety. In R. D. Hare & D. Schalling 
154 
(Eds.), Psychopathic behavior: Approaches to 
research. New York: Wiley, 1978. 
Staub, E. The use of role playing and induction in chil-
dren's learning of helping and sharing behavior. 
Child Development, 1971, ~' 805-816. 
Sternberg, T., Payson, J., & Evans, T. The effects of 
morality and prior experience on helping by schizo-
phrenics. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 1974, 
30, 259-260. 
Stotland, E. Exploratory investigations of empathy. In 
L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimentsl social 
psychology (Vol. 4). New York: Academic Press, 
1969. 
Sulzer, J. L., & Burglass, R. K. Responsibility attribu-
tion, empathy, and punitiveness. Journal of Per-
sonality, 1968, ~' 272-282. 
Syndulko, K. Electrocortical investigations of sociopathy. 
In R. D. Hare & D. Schalling (Eds.), Psychopathic 
behavior: Approaches to research. London: Wiley, 
1978. 
Tolor, A., Kelly, B. R., & Stebbins, c. A. Altruism in 
psychiatric patients: How socially concerned are 
the emotionally disturbed? Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 1976, !!' 503-507. 
Truax, c. B. The meaning and reliability of accurate 
155 
empathy ratings: A rejoinder. Psychological Bul-
letin,_ 1972, 77, 397-399. 
Wagner, c., Manning, s., & Wheeler, L. Character structure 
and helping behavior. Journal of Experimental Re-
search in Personality, 1971, ~, 37-42. 
Wener, B. D., & Pisano, R. L. Relationship between al-
truism and aggression using behavioral measures. 
Psychological Reports, 1977, !Q, 673-674. 
Widom, C. S. Interpersonal and personal construct systems 
in psychopaths. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 1976, 44, 614-623. 
Widom, C. s. Toward an understanding of female criminality. 
In B. A. Maher (Ed.), Progress in experimental 
personality research (Vol. 8). New York: Academic 
Press, 1978. 
Yochelson, s., & Samenow, s. E. The criminal personality 
(Vol. 1). New York: Jason Aronson, 1977. 
Zajonc, R. B. Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no 
inferences. American Psychologist, 1980, ~' 
151-175. 
Ziskind, E. The diagnosis of sociopathy. In R. D. Hare 
& D. Schalling (Eds.), Psychopathic behavior: 
Approaches to research. New York: Wiley, 1978. 
APPENDIX A 
157 
Consent Form 
I understand that my 
participation in the research being conducted by Norman 
Reed is voluntary and that I may withdraw from it at any 
time without consequence. 
(s1.gnature) 
(date) 
SUBJ. No. 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
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0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
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BEHAVIOR PROBLEM CHECKLIST 
1. Oddness, bizarre behavior 
2. Restlessness, inability to sit still 
3. Attention-seeking, "show-off" behavior 
4. Stays out late at night 
5. Doesn't know how to have fun; behaves like a 
little adult 
6. Self-consciousness; easily embarrassed 
7. Fixed expression, lack of emotional reactiv-
ity 
8. Disruptiveness; tendency to annoy & bother 
others 
9. Feelings of inferiority 
10. Steals in company with others 
11. Boisterousness, rowdiness 
12. Crying over minor annoyances and hurts 
13. Preoccupation; "in a world of his own" 
14. Shyness, bashfulness 
15. Social withdrawn, preference for solitary 
activities 
16. Dislike for school 
17. Jealousy over attention paid other children 
18. Belongs to a gang 
19. Repetitive speech 
20. Short attention span 
21. Lack of self-confidence 
22. Inattentiveness to what others say 
23. Easily flustered and confused 
24. Incoherent speech 
25. Fighting 
26. Loyal to delinquent friends 
27. Temper tantrums 
28. Reticence, secretiveness 
29. Truancy from school 
30. Hypersensitivity; feelings easily hurt 
31. Laziness in school and in performance of 
other tasks 
32. Anxiety, chronic general fearfulness 
33. Irresponsibility, undependability 
34. Excessive daydreaming 
35. Masturbation 
36. Has bad companions 
37. Tension, inability to relax 
38. Disobedience, difficulty in disciplinary 
control 
39. Depression, chronic sadness 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
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40. Uncooperativeness in group situations 
41. Aloofness, social reserve 
42. Passivity, suggestibility; easily led by 
others 
43. Clumsiness, awkwardness, poor muscular co-
ordination 
44. Hyperactivity; "always on the go" 
45. Distractibility 
46. Destructiveness in regard to his own and/or 
other's property 
47. Negativism, tendency to do the opposite of 
what is requested 
48. Impertinence, sauciness 
49. Sluggishness, lethargy 
50. Drowsiness 
51. Profane language, swearing, cursing 
52. Nervousness, jitteriness, jumpiness; easily 
startled 
53. Irritability; hot-tempered, easily aroused 
to anger 
54. Enuresis, bed-wetting 
55. Often has physical complaints, e.g., head-
aches, stomach aches 
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REVISED EMOTIONAL EMPATHY SCALE 
DATE: ______ __ SEX: AGE: 
Instructions: Read each statement and answer True (T) or 
False (F) as applied to you. 
1. It makes me sad to see someone who doesn't have 
any friends. 
2. People make too much fuss over the feelings of 
animals. 
3. I get angry when someone shows too much love. 
4. I am bothered by unhappy people who feel sorry 
for themselves. 
5. I am nervous if others around me are nervous. 
6. I find it silly for people to cry when very happy. 
7. I get too involved with a friend's problems. 
8. Sometimes the words of a love song make me happy 
or sad. 
9. I am sad when I tell people bad news. 
10. The people around me make me grouchy. 
11. Most people from other countries I have met 
seemed unfriendly. 
12. I would rather be a social (welfare) worker than 
work at training people to do jobs. 
13. I don't get upset just because a friend is upset. 
14. I like to watch people open presents. 
15. Lonely people are unfriendly. 
16. Seeing people cry upsets me. 
17. Some songs make me happy. 
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18. I sometimes feel just like the hero of a story. 
19. I get very angry when I see someone being treated 
wrong. 
20. I am calm even if people around me worry about 
things. 
21. When a friend starts to talk about his problems, 
I try to talk about something else. 
22. Somebody laughing doesn't make me laugh. 
23. Sometimes at the movies I laugh at people who 
cry about the pictures. 
24. I can make decisions without being bothered by 
other people's feelings. 
25. I get sad and unhappy if people around me are sad. 
26. It is hard for me to see how some things upset 
people so much. 
27. I am very upset when I see an animal in pain. 
28. Getting excited or very interested in books or 
movies is a little silly. 
29. I feel uneasy when I see helpless old people. 
30. Sometimes I feel angry when I see someone cry. 
31. I get very involved when I watch a movie. 
32. I often find that I can remain calm in spite of 
the excitement around me. 
33. Little children sometimes cry for no reason. 
34. I do what I want to do, whether anybody likes it 
or not. 
35. A person is better off if he doesn't trust anyone. 
36. I feel tired a good deal of the time. 
37. I don't think I'm quite as happy as others seem 
to be. 
162 
38. The only way to make big money is to steal it. 
39. It seems as if people are always telling me what 
to do, or how to do things. 
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DETACHMENT SCALE 
Insturctions: Read each statement and answer True (T) or 
False (F) as applied to you. 
1. It is easy for me to get close to paople 
2. I want to confide in someone, when I am worried 
and unhappy. 
3. I avoid people who are interested in my personal 
life. 
4. I feel uncomfortable when people take me into 
their confidence. 
5. I am deeply moves by other people's misfortunes. 
6. I feel best when I keep people at a certain dis-
tance. 
7. I prefer to avoid involving myself in other 
people's personal problems. 
8. People generally think that I hide my feelings so 
that they have difficulties in understanding me. 
9. I consider myself reserved and a little cold 
rather than kind and warm. 
10. People often come to me with their troubles. 
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How much do you think that Torn's problem on the tape was 
caused by: 
1. Torn, himself. 
0 
None at 
2. Torn's friend, Bob. 
None at 
3. The staff. 
None at 
4. Torn's luck. 
0 10 
None at all 
40 
40 
5. Torn's way of talking. 
20 30 40 
None at 
50 
50 60 70 80 
90 100 
Very much 
Bob: Hi, Tom! 
Tom: Hi, Bob! 
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TAPE CONTENT 
Bob: How do you like it here at the Home so far? 
Tom: Well, you know ••• 
Bob: Yeah, I know what you mean •••• Say, you're really 
workin up a sweat with that mop. 
Tom: You better believe it! I've been mopping the hall-
ways since breakfast and I still have to wax all of 
them. I was suppose to go to the gym now to play 
some B-ball but the staff won't let me go until I'm 
finished with this mopping. Everyone else has fin-
ished their work and are already at the gym. The way 
this moppin is going, I probably won't play ball at 
all today. 
Bob: Yeah ••• when what's going on° How come you're 
doing the floors? 
Tom: Well, for some reason the jobs were all changed 
around this-morning and I got stuck with all the 
mopping and waxing for the week. 
Bob: Say, that's too bad. That's hard work. How come 
you're doing it all alone? When I had to do the 
floors, two other guys were assigned to work with me. 
I only had to do a small part of the ahll and we 
finished it in no time at all. 
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Torn: Yeah, well I guess they haven't sent enough guys 
here this week. There are only enough guys here to 
give one guy all of the mopping for the whole week. 
So, here I am. • 
Bob: Well, I'm glad it is you and not me. I'd give you a 
hand but I've got schoolwork due tomorrow. 
Torn: Yeah, so do I. 
Bob: Well, take it easy, Torn. 
Torn: Yeah, when I get a chance. 
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